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INTRODUCTION
Delaware dominates the corporate law market.' More than half
of all public companies and over sixty percent of the Fortune 500 are
1. Delaware took the incorporation business from New Jersey in the early 1900s and never
looked back. See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965, 969-70 (1995) (discussing Delaware's success in attracting corporations in the
wake of New Jersey laws outlawing the trust and holding company).
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incorporated in Delaware. 2 These companies are subject to Delaware's
corporate law regardless of where their businesses are physically
located. Although academics continue to debate whether it is good or
bad,3 they have long agreed that Delaware's dominance is a result of
its law and its judiciary.4 As a corollary, it was widely understood that
Delaware courts decided most cases involving Delaware corporations. 5
The discovery that litigation involving these corporations very
often takes place outside of Delaware therefore came as something of a
shock.6 Recent research shows that more cases are filed against
2. See Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last updated
Mar. 23, 2013); see also Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1572 (2002) (finding that ninety-five percent of all companies that seek legal rules
from a state that is not the location of their headquarters incorporate in Delaware). Delaware
hosts a substantial share of all corporations that incorporate outside of their home state. See
Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence
on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1804 (2002) ("[B]y
2000[,] approximately half of all NYSE companies were incorporated in Delaware.").
3. See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 663, 684-86 (1974) (criticizing Delaware's lax corporation laws and proposing
federal minimum-standards legislation); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289-92 (1977) (arguing that
competition among states to attract corporations to incorporate in their states, including
Delaware's primacy in this market, actually results in laws to better protect shareholders).
4. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1074-81 (2000) (discussing the unique role of
Delaware courts in making and developing corporate law). Other academic commentators have
focused on Delaware's special incentive, deriving from incorporation revenues, to achieve
balanced outcomes between the interests of managers, on the one hand, and shareholders, on the
other. If Delaware jurisprudence drifts too far in favor of shareholders' interests, Delaware is
faced with the risk that managers will seek to incorporate elsewhere. Meanwhile, if Delaware
were to be seen as overly biased in favor of managers' interests, the state would risk increased
federal incursion in corporate lawmaking. These twin constraints force chancery judges to adopt
a balanced perspective in deciding disputes between shareholders and managers. See generally
Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law
Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005);
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
5. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993); Ehud
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1908, 1926 (1998) ("[The bulk of suits pursuant to Delaware corporate law are filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery."); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 165 (2004)
("[Delaware] is the center of shareholder litigation in this country.").
6. The disturbance to the academic community's settled understanding can be roughly
gauged by the large number of papers recently written on the topic. Since two key articles by
John Armour, Bernard Black, and Brian Cheffins were first circulated in 2010, a significant
number of papers have appeared on the subject. The two key works are: John Armour, Bernard
Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware's Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345 (2012) [hereinafter ABC,
Balancing Act], and John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its
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Delaware corporations in other states than in Delaware itself.7 As
practitioners have long lamented, not only are companies sued in
connection with every major merger or acquisition transaction, it now
appears that they are sued multiple times in multiple places;
increasingly, these cases are resolved outside of Delaware., As a forum
for corporate litigation, Delaware no longer dominates.
The out-of-Delaware trend in corporate litigation could be
significant for corporate law. Delaware corporate law is largely judge
made.9 The Delaware statute is famously enabling, providing for
maximum flexibility in the design of governance arrangements. 0
Judges set the outward bounds of this flexibility by applying general
principles of fiduciary duty to guard against opportunistic conduct in
particular transactions." The accretion of precedent from these cases
forms the true substance of Delaware corporate law. Shaken from
their settled understandings, academic commentators have sounded
the alarm that fewer cases decided in Delaware could, over time,
reduce the expertise of the Delaware judiciary in corporate law
matters.12 Worse, others have argued, the decisions reached by non-
Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012) [hereinafter ABC, Losing Cases]. Other articles
include Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 92, 92-93 (2012) [hereinafter Cain & Davidoff, Competitive Reach] (noting that
firms and shareholders have increasingly opted to adjudicate disputes in other competing
jurisdictions); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation (Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Cain & Davidoff,
Great Game], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1984758; Edward
B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem,
and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2012); Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum
Shareholder Litigation (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Randall S.
Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its
Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1753 (2012); Verity Winship,
Bargaining for Exclusive State Jurisdiction (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-21, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046552.
7. ABC, Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 18-20.
8. Id. at 21-22.
9. Fisch, supra note 4, at 1074-75.
10. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674 (2005) ("[Olur statute is, by
design, a broad enabling one that permits and facilitates company-specific procedures.").
11. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1621 (1989):
[W]hat is most mandatory in corporate law is not the specific substantive content of
any rule, but rather the institution of judicial oversight . . .. In drafting the corporate
contract, lawyers rely less on the model form provided by the legislature than on their
expectation that courts will prevent either side from taking "opportunistic" advantage
of the other.
12. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad
Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 750-51 (2009)
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Delaware "dilatants" threaten to adulterate and degrade the basic
Delaware product.13 In sum, prior commentary on the out-of-Delaware
trend has treated it as very bad for corporate defendants,14 very bad
for shareholder plaintiffs,15 and very bad for Delaware.16
We don't see it that way. In our view, the out-of-Delaware
trend has awakened an active "market for preclusion" in which parties
seek to trade the preclusive effect of a judgment in exchange for
compensation.' 7 Multijurisdictional litigation is essential to making
this market work since related claims filed in a single jurisdiction can
be consolidated,' 8 but related claims filed in different jurisdictions
(noting that Delaware courts would lose their judicial expertise in corporate matters over time if
they decided fewer cases involving issues of Delaware corporate law).
13. See Jed S. Rakoff, Lecture, Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of
Economic Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 4-14 (2012); see also Kahan & Rock, supra
note 12, at 751 (noting that over the long term loss of control over the corporate law caseload
could cause Delaware law to "be less developed (due to the smaller number of cases), possibly
become less coherent (due to the presence of decisions decided by other courts), and its judiciary
could lose part of its expertise (due to the smaller number of cases heard)").
14. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., COORDINATING
RELATED SECURITIES LITIGATION: A POSITION PAPER 2 (2008) [hereinafter NYC BAR REPORT],
available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/SecuritiesLitigation_%20A.pdf (lamenting that
"publicly listed companies are often forced to spend resources trying to coordinate and manage
duplicative or overlapping securities litigations (with the brunt being borne by current
shareholders), while judicial resources are unnecessarily consumed").
15. See MARK LEBOVITCH ET AL., MAKING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE
ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION IN MULTIJURISDICTIONAL MERGER RELATED LITIGATION 1
(2011), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc-files/MakingOrderoutofChaos (stating that
parallel litigation "wastes judicial resources, unduly burdens defendants, and most importantly,
threatens shareholders").
16. See, e.g., ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1380-81 (stating that a decrease in
Delaware's hearing of quality corporate cases would impair the court's expertise in corporate
matters and affect the state's market share in incorporations); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note
12, at 750-51 (noting that Delaware courts would lose their judicial expertise in corporate
matters over time if they decided fewer cases involving issues of Delaware corporate law).
17. For prior uses of the term, see generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 159-81 (2003); Mark C.
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1200 n.229 (1998) (explaining that "the defendant is the one
that must make a uniform offer to a large group in order to maximize its utility in the market for
preclusion"); see also ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009)
(emphasizing the market analogy in choice-of-law context).
18. For example, a case filed in Texas may be consolidated with other Texas cases, but not
with a case proceeding in Delaware. There is no interstate mechanism for transferring cases,
even when they contain identical subject matter, plaintiff classes, and defendants. Yvette
Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and
Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 66 (2007). And there is no mechanism for transferring cases
from a federal court to any state court; the federal courts only have the power to remand cases to
the state court from whence they originally came. Within the federal system, however, cases may
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cannot. 19 Multijurisdictional litigation thus creates a market of
multiple sellers-that is, competing plaintiffs' counsel in each
jurisdiction, each of whom has the power to settle.20 Moreover, thanks
to the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 21 the first settlement approved by a court precludes all
other claims relating to the same underlying matter.22
The preclusive effect of settlement creates enormous value for
the defendant. Without it, defendants' planned transactions will be
burdened by potentially large contingent liabilities and may even be
enjoined. Upon reaching a preclusive settlement and resolving all
shareholder claims, the transaction can move forward to closing. The
market for preclusion facilitates the transfer of this valuable
commodity. When it is working well, this market provides a reliable
price-discovery mechanism for shareholder claims, allowing low-value
claims to settle quickly and cheaply while higher-value claims are
litigated more aggressively.
Most prior commentary focuses on eliminating duplicative
multijurisdictional merger litigation through consolidation or
centralization. 23 Our contrarian account of the out-of-Delaware trend
be consolidated in one venue for pretrial purposes. 28 U.S.C. §1407 (2006). States have similar
provisions.
19. Other state law class actions can be easily removed to federal court so long as they
exceed five million dollars and are not completely local in character. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). As a
result, they can be consolidated in the federal court system under the multidistrict litigation
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). But cases sounding in state corporate law are
exempt from the Class Action Fairness Act's ("CAFA") mandate. 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
20. In economic theory, a market is the "sum of buyers and sellers of any good or service
and their interaction." CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND
ECONoMICS 287 (1986). Consolidated claims result in a negotiation between one buyer (the
defendant) and one seller (the consolidated lead plaintiff) but cannot be characterized as a
market.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
22. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399 (1996) (holding that a
Delaware settlement was entitled to full faith and credit and precluded federal court plaintiffs
from continuing their lawsuit unless they could show a due process violation in the suit that
settled first). If a putative class member demonstrates that the prior judgment violated due
process, a subsequent court can append the settlement. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273
F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539
U.S. 111 (2003). Because Stephenson was affirmed by an equally divided Court, the law is not
settled with respect to the scope of a collateral attack on a class action settlement on due process
grounds. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this principle as this Article went to press.
Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013)
(dismissing suit filed in Delaware based on California court's prior dismissal of derivative action
with prejudice).
23. See infra Part III.A (discussing proposals to centralize merger litigation in the federal
courts or in Delaware).
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seeks both to identify overlooked benefits of the present system and
also to gain a clearer understanding of its flaws. Reframing
multijurisdictional litigation as a market process illuminates the core
concern of agency costs; in doing so, we point the way to policy choices
that are more consistent with the basic structure of federalism than
an approach focusing on consolidation or centralization.2 4 Our policy
proposals thus seek to maintain the competitive structure of the
current system while providing for more effective monitoring and
communication among courts. Under our proposal, Delaware courts
will have the opportunity to fast-track strong lawsuits and leave
weaker lawsuits to be settled in alternative forums. The difficulty will
be to determine which are which.
Our account also illustrates two broader points. First, it
highlights yet another way in which procedure is often outcome
determinative. 25 Second, our account highlights the flaws in prevailing
notions of interstate comity.26 Comity is generally understood as
having two prongs-first, the idea that states are sovereign in their
own territory, and second, the requirement that all states respect and
enforce the laws and judgments of sister states.27 Corporate law
litigation presents a challenge to this traditional understanding of
comity because Delaware exports its corporate law far beyond its
territorial borders. Corporations in every state of the Union operate
wholly outside of Delaware yet are creatures of its law. Since most
commentators on federalism focus on the vertical relationship between
24. Forum shopping, of course, is widely criticized. Such criticisms, at their core, are
critiques of "our federalism"-defined as the "recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
25. In the words of Rep. John Dingell (D-Michigan): "I'll let you write the substance ... and
you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every time." Regulatory Reform Act of 1983:
Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
26. The relationship between the federal government and the states is the subject of a great
deal of scholarship. Often this scholarship addresses the ability of the federal government to
regulate disputes between the states. We have found very little scholarly development of the
concept of comity between the states and their responsibility of mutual respect toward one
another where the federal government is not involved, and what literature there is focuses
narrowly on particular issues such as child custody disputes. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal
Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 569 (2008) (discussing the limited scholarship and doctrinal
development of the concept of comity and calling for more study); Winship, supra note 6, at 56-
62 (describing doctrinal limits of states' ability to export their law and judgments).
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2013] 1059
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the federal government and the states or localities, they offer no
coherent vision of what is to be done when states clash.28
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I we describe merger
litigation and introduce the out-of-Delaware phenomenon. In Part II
we develop the idea of a market for preclusion in merger litigation; we
first describe how a well-functioning market might provide benefits to
all of the stakeholders in deal litigation-plaintiffs, defendants, and
Delaware itself-then show how the opportunistic conduct of
attorneys can distort the outcomes of this market. In Part III we
consider solutions to these market defects, criticizing prior proposals
in favor of consolidation and centralization. We offer, instead, a theory
and practice of comity through dialogue that seeks to address the
shortcomings of the market while preserving its benefits.
I. MERGER LITIGATION IN AND OUT OF DELAWARE
This Part describes the problems caused by the interaction of
an active plaintiffs' bar that files numerous suits related to almost
every merger and the availability of several alternative forums for
filing these suits. We begin by describing the law governing mergers.
We then document the phenomenon of parallel litigation and the
migration of cases out of Delaware, relying on recent empirical studies
and anecdotal evidence. We end by considering the rules for
determining which of several competing jurisdictions will ultimately
decide or otherwise dispose of the claim.
A. Merger Litigation
Shareholders can sue over almost anything their managers do.
For example, they may believe that the corporation should not have
opened a new plant or that it should not have closed an old one. 29 They
may think that their managers are overpaid. 30 They may object to the
28. Recent work has begun to fill this lacuna. See generally ROBERT SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC
FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Robert B. Ahdieh,
Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029
(2004); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010);
Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 717-21 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Abrams v. Allen, 113 N.Y.S.2d 181, 184-85 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (shareholder suit
against defendant corporation in connection to its dismantling and removal of corporate plants).
30. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213-15 (Del. 1996).
1060 [Vol. 66:4:1053
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way in which the board agreed to sell the company.3' Most of these
lawsuits are unlikely to get very far, however, as a result of both
substantive and procedural rules. Procedurally, courts will treat most
of these complaints as derivative rather than direct, 32 causing them to
face considerably greater obstacles to recovery.3 3 Additionally, without
evidence of a clear conflict of interest, most of these complaints
implicate only the duty of care owed by management to shareholders.
The business judgment rule will operate as a strong substantive
barrier to recovery.34 In fact, if the defendant corporation adopted an
exculpation provision in its charter, as many public companies have,
the court will dismiss most of the above complaints for failure to state
a claim on which relief can be granted. 35
The exception is the complaint involving the sale of the
company. Under Delaware law, a corporation can be sold either by its
shareholders through a tender offer or by its board of directors in a
merger, acquisition, or other business combination. For the sake of
brevity, we refer to these transactions collectively as "mergers."
Although the board negotiates and agrees to any merger, shareholders
hold three important rights. First, a majority of shareholders must
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863-64 (Del. 1985) (shareholder suit
seeking rescission of a cash-out merger of a corporation into a new corporation).
32. The distinction depends on whether the shareholder's injury is separate and
independent of an injury to the corporation. See, e.g., Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1213-15 (explaining
the derivative/direct distinction); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.
1985), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (describing a direct claim as "an injury which is separate
and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, . . . or a wrong involving a contractual
right of a shareholder . .. which exists independently of any right of the corporation") (internal
quotations omitted). See generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-40 (1986) ("[A derivative suit
is one in which] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation for harm done to it. Ordinarily,
therefore, any damages recovered in the suit are paid to the corporation.").
33. For example, a derivative plaintiff must either make demand on the board-that is,
formally ask the board to bring the suit themselves-or plead that demand should be excused,
arguing, in effect, that the board is so conflicted in deciding whether to bring the claim, typically
because the directors are being asked to sue themselves, that making formal demand would be
futile and ought therefore to be excused. Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits:
Demand and Futility Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 173
(1994). In some jurisdictions (but not Delaware), derivative plaintiffs must post a bond to
reimburse the corporation for frivolous claims (judged by early dismissal). E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 627 (McKinney 2012). Moreover, derivative plaintiffs can have control of their claim
wrested from them by special litigation committees who are subsequently free to dismiss the
claim unless the shareholder plaintiff can successfully challenge the independence of the
committee. Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An
Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1312-16 (2009).
34. See Griffith, supra note 4, at 11-13 (describing operation of the business judgment rule).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013); see also McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d
1262, 1277 (Del. Ch. 2008) (dismissing colorable claims of gross negligence and reckless
indifference on basis of defendant's § 102(b)(7) provision).
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vote to approve the transaction before it can be consummated. 36
Second, shareholders will often have the right, after consummation, to
sue for appraisal, a process in which objecting shareholders may force
the acquirer to pay them a higher judicially declared "appraised value"
for their shares. 37 Third, shareholders have the right to sue their
board for breach of fiduciary duty in agreeing to the transaction in the
first place. We refer to this third type of suit as "merger litigation,"
and it will occupy our attention here.
Shareholders can bring merger claims directly or in the form of
a class action, thereby avoiding the procedural complexities of the
derivative suit.38 Additionally, claims brought in merger litigation-
even those involving no clear conflict of interest-typically do not
receive the protection of the business judgment rule. Regardless of
overt conflict, if a merger involves a "change of control"-essentially, a
transaction that results in target shareholders losing voting control
over the target corporation-then the process of negotiating and
agreeing to the merger will be subject to a form of enhanced judicial
scrutiny.39 If a merger involves a conflict of interest, such as a
"squeeze-out," management buyout, or other non-arm's length
transaction, then judicial scrutiny is even more exacting; the law
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251. This can be a supermajority requirement if specified in the
charter. Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Craig B. Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending Self-
Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 699-700 (1979).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
38. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 5, at 168 (reporting the results of a multiyear
study of Delaware chancery court litigation finding that "[a]lmost all (94 percent: 772 of 824)
class action suits arise in an acquisition setting whereas almost all (90 percent: 123 of 137) of the
derivative suits arise in a non-acquisition setting").
39. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993) (noting
that directors' conduct is subjected to enhanced judicial scrutiny in a transaction involving
change of control of the company); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180 (Del. 1986) (stating that in the context of antitakeover measures, the board's responsive
action has to be reasonable); see also Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early Then Free
Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1807-
11 (2004) (summarizing the cases). Weiss and White elegantly summarize the rationale
underlying merger law in the following:
The Delaware courts' rationale for holding that sales of control are subject to
enhanced scrutiny is that shareholders' voting rights are of overriding importance
because they constitute the principal mechanism of shareholder participation in
corporate governance. Consequently, shareholders should be compensated if and when
the corporation enters into a transaction-a sale of control-that will result in the loss
of these governance rights.
Weiss & White, supra, at 1809.
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requires "entire fairness"-ssentially, a fair process and a fair price. 40
These enhanced standards give plaintiffs strong grounds to contest
mergers. Not surprisingly, one or more groups of shareholder
plaintiffs very often challenge a merger.41 Even when a merger does
not clearly involve a change of control or an obvious conflict of
interest, shareholder plaintiffs may file claims alleging the possibility
of disloyal conduct in connection with the merger.42
Merger litigation asks existential questions on an expedited
basis. 43 A paradigmatic shareholder claim involving a merger would
allege some flaw in the sale process. The shareholder might allege an
insufficiently competitive auction, deal-protection provisions designed
to the advantage of a particular bidder, or anything that might
compromise the neutral judgment of the board in agreeing to the
deal-golden parachute payments for managers in connection with a
change of control, for example.44 The shareholder will further allege
40. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair
dealing and fair price in non-arm's length transactions); see also Weiss & White, supra note 39,
at 1813-21 (summarizing case law and litigation tactics).
41. Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 13 (finding that "87.3% and 92.1% of all
transactions experience[d] litigation in 2010 and 2011, respectively, pointing to an increasing
trend of litigation by percentage and number over time").
42. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cornerstone.com
/files/News/d7e418ea-eb2c-4al7-8eae-de25lOd9dlba/Presentation/NewsAttachment/8b664075-
ebfb-4cce-aa76-8aO5befad3/CornerstoneResearchShareholder_ MandA_Litigation.pdf.
43. Such questions include: Will the corporation continue to exist, or will it be subsumed by
another entity? Will the shareholders continue as such or will they be cashed out of their
investment? And how much is all of it worth? Expanding on the fundamental importance of
merger litigation, Thompson and Thomas argue:
In hostile takeovers, management entrenchment and refusal to sell the company
when a sale is in the shareholders' best interests are serious risks posed by the
delegation of these decisions to the board of directors. In friendly sales to a third
party, there is the constant fear that management may sell the firm too cheaply in
order to obtain lucrative severance packages or employment contracts with the
acquirer. Finally, if management itself, or a controlling shareholder, is the acquirer,
managerial agency costs may be high because of the conflict of interest between the
managers' duty to get the best deal for shareholders and their own self-interest (or
that of the controlling shareholder) in implementing terms that minimize what the
insiders will have to pay to gain control of the remaining interests in the corporation.
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 5, at 145.
44. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 1:
Common allegations include the deal terms not resulting from a sufficiently
competitive auction, the existence of restrictive deal protections that discouraged
additional bids, or the impact of various conflicts of interests, such as executive
retention or change-of-control payments to executives. Complaints also typically
allege that a target's board failed to disclose sufficient information to shareholders to
enable their informed vote. Insufficient disclosure allegations have focused on
information related to the sale process, the reasons for the board's actions, financial
projections, and the financial advisors' fairness opinions.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that these flaws in the process caused damage by leading to
inadequate consideration in the merger price, inadequate disclosure in
connection with the shareholder vote, or both. Shareholder plaintiffs
may sue for an injunction barring consummation of the transaction or
additional consideration or other monetary relief. At the very least,
plaintiffs can request corrective disclosure prior to the shareholder
vote. Along the way, they are likely to seek expedited discovery in
order to support their allegations. All of these demands put significant
pressure on the transaction. A deal that is enjoined, even temporarily,
may fall apart. Extensive discovery will likely slow down the deal,
adding cost and increasing the risk of nonconsummation. In order to
minimize contingent liabilities and be assured of a legally valid
transaction, both parties to the merger typically insist that such
litigation be concluded before the transaction can close. Defendants,
therefore, often seek to settle merger litigation as swiftly as possible.
Recent empirical studies of merger litigation involving
significant U.S. public-company acquisitions summarize the
settlement patterns of these cases. 45 These studies find that nearly
seventy percent of these suits settle while the rest result in
dismissal.46 The vast majority of suits in one study settled before the
merger closed, most often within forty-five days of filing and generally
before a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.47 Very few of these suits (approximately five percent)
resulted in any payment to shareholders. The vast majority settled for
nonpecuniary relief, most often for additional disclosures in the
communications to shareholders.48 A small number of settlements
45. See, e.g., id. (collecting and analyzing data on U.S. public-company acquisitions over one
hundred million dollars announced in 2010 and 2011); Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note
6 (collecting and analyzing data on U.S. public-company acquisitions over one hundred million
dollars announced and completed between 2005 and 2010).
46. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 8 (finding that sixty-nine percent of the 565
suits for which the authors could track the resolution resulted in settlement, while twenty-seven
percent were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs, and four percent were dismissed with
prejudice); Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6 ("[L]itigation with respect to transactions
is dismissed by the court 28.4% of the time. The other 71.6% of transaction litigations result in
some type of settlement.").
47. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 9:
Of the 190 unique settlements we identified, 180 were reached before the merger
closed. Most of these were reached shortly before a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction (restraining order) or shortly before the shareholder vote.
The median time between lawsuit filing and settlement in this sample was forty-four
days.
48. Id. at 10 (reporting that nine out of 190 settlements sampled resulted in payments to
shareholders, while eighty-two percent resulted in disclosure-based settlements); Cain &
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(approximately thirteen percent) resulted in changes to the merger
agreement, most often to the deal-protection provisions; none of these
changes resulted in a higher bid for the target. 49 The plaintiffs'
attorneys were compensated in each settlement-even if they did not
recover any additional payments for shareholders-because of the
"substantial benefit" the additional disclosures or changes to the
merger agreement brought the shareholder plaintiffs.50 The average
plaintiffs' attorneys' fee award for settlement found in the studies
generally varies between one million dollars and $1.5 million.51 Many
of the fee awards were five hundred thousand dollars or less.52
Transaction planners frequently complain that settlements in
merger litigation amount to little more than a "deal tax," where
plaintiffs' attorneys are effectively paid off to allow the companies to
go about their business.53 Other commentators see it as a more serious
cost.5 4 However, there is also evidence that shareholder litigation is
Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 16 ("Settlements which only require disclosure constitute
55.1% of the settlement types in the sample and are the most common type of settlement.").
49. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 10 ("Other merger agreement changes
included the terms of top-up option and appraisal rights. Eleven settlements (6 percent) involved
other terms, most often a delay of the shareholder vote.").
50. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
51. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 11 (reporting an average settlement of $1.2
million, a number that was likely skewed high by a small number of very large awards-only
twenty-three percent of reported attorneys' fees were one million dollars or higher); Cain &
Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at tbl.2, Panel C. Both studies find significant skew between
mean and median settlement amounts, suggesting that mean numbers are driven higher by a
small number of significantly higher awards. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 11
("Only nineteen (23 percent) of the reported attorney fees were $1 million or higher."); Cain &
Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at tbl.2, Panel C.
52. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 11 ("43 percent of the reported attorney fees
were at or under $500,000."); Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 18-19 (reporting
median fees of approximately five hundred thousand dollars across several states). Interestingly,
Cain and Davidoff connect attorneys' fees to settlement award, finding that "on average $1.7
million is awarded for a disclosure and amendment settlement, compared to $793,000 for a
'disclosure only' settlement." Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 17.
53. 31 No. 6 OF COUNSEL (CCH)15 (2012).
54. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew Jennejohn, Putting
Stockholders First, Not the First Filed Complaint 16 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ.,
& Bus. Discussion Paper No. 74, Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2200499 (arguing that merger litigation often amounts to deadweight
loss because shareholders receive additional consideration in "5% of the time" yet plaintiffs'
lawyers receive fees "100% of the time"); see also Kevin LaCroix, Why M&A-Related Litigation Is
a Serious Problem, THE D&O DIARY (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2011/11/articles/securities-litigation/why-marelated-litigation-is-a-serious-problem/ (arguing that
significant increases in the size of merger and acquisition ("M&A")-related settlements suggests
that these suits can no longer be dismissed as high-frequency, low-severity claims). In his words:
[I]t is increasingly common for the settlement of these cases to also involve significant
cash payments. Indeed, the settlements in many of these cases suddenly are starting
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associated with an increase in deal value.55 This debate inevitably
merges with questions concerning the value of nonpecuniary relief and
the merits of merger litigation more generally, all of which we will
treat as empirical questions beyond the scope of this Article. Instead,
we will here assume that the underlying substantive law has been
arranged in such a way that it may lead to meritorious claims in
merger litigation. This simplifying assumption enables us to isolate
what happens when these claims can be brought simultaneously in
multiple jurisdictions.
B. A Litigation Migration: Out of Delaware
The merger litigation described above can be brought in
multiple forums. Delaware will always have jurisdiction over
Delaware-incorporated businesses,56 but it will not, absent a provision
in the corporate charter, have exclusive jurisdiction.57 Other states
and the federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Delaware
corporations. Under the so-called "internal affairs doctrine," the law
that applies to corporate law disputes is the law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation of the defendant corporation regardless of the forum
where the suit is brought.58 As we shall see, this clear choice-of-law
rule is only the beginning of the inquiry.
Plaintiffs can always sue a corporation in two locations: its
state of incorporation and the state where its headquarters is
to resemble in order of magnitude the settlements of securities class action
lawsuits. . . . Contrary to popular perception, the new M&A litigation model
represents both a high frequency and a high severity risk. The severity risk is
particularly acute given the exacerbating effects of escalating defense expenses and
rising plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
LaCroix, supra; see also ADVISEN, MERGER OBJECTION SUITS: A THREAT TO PRIMARY D&O
INSURERS? (2011), available at https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Merger Objection Suits.pdf
(reaching the same conclusion).
55. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquistions, 18 J. CORP.
FIN. 1248, 1265 (2012) (finding that deals attracting litigation are slightly less likely to be
completed, but that those deals that are completed enjoy a small premium over those
transactions that are not challenged, and concluding that "the expected rise in the takeover
premia more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion").
56. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011)
(identifying a corporation's state of incorporation as one example of a paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction).
57. See infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text (discussing disputes concerning putting
Delaware choice of forum provisions in charters and bylaws).
58. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 35-36 (2006) (explaining the internal affairs doctrine).
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located.59 Once the plaintiffs determine in which states they can sue
the corporation, they must decide whether to sue in state or federal
court.60 A Delaware corporation may be sued in federal court so long
as the federal court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
In a lawsuit arising out of a deal, the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal court may be based on diversity jurisdiction or, if additional
federal claims are brought, on federal question and supplemental
jurisdiction. 61 A federal court in Delaware, for example, could exercise
jurisdiction over a lawsuit arising out of a merger of a Delaware
corporation where the named class members are citizens of a different
state than the corporation. 62 Since the plaintiffs can strategically
choose their class representative, federal diversity jurisdiction is
almost always available.63
Plaintiffs have recently been taking increasing advantage of
the choices of forum available to them by filing merger litigation in
courts other than Delaware state court-other than, in other words,
59. Personal jurisdiction over a corporation will always be proper in the state where its
headquarters is located. A corporation may be sued wherever the corporation is "essentially at
home." Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. Jurisdiction may also be available where the defendant has
sufficient contacts so that it is fair to exercise jurisdiction over it and wherever the defendant
consents to jurisdiction. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (holding that
personal jurisdiction over a corporation is proper in forums where the corporation has such
minimum contacts that exercising jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice").
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1) (limiting reach of a federal court's personal jurisdiction to that of
the state in which the court sits).
61. 28 U.S.C § 1331 (2006) (federal question jurisdiction); § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); §
1367 (supplemental jurisdiction); see also Jessica Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An
Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 66 n.65 (2011) (describing reliance on both federal
question and diversity jurisdiction in derivative class actions in federal court).
62. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (holding that the standard for determining
the citizenship of a corporation for diversity jurisdiction purposes is the "nerve center" test).
However, a Delaware corporation cannot remove such a lawsuit to federal court if it was filed in
Delaware. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2) (exempting cases relating to the internal affairs or
governance of a corporation from the lenient removal provisions of CAFA).
63. At least one named plaintiff needs to have a claim that exceeds seventy-five thousand
dollars, which means that lawyers seeking to file a merger suit in federal court need a plaintiff
who is both diverse and a substantial shareholder. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). As a result, in some cases
plaintiffs must wait until after the proxy is released so that they will have a federal proxy claim
in order to be able to access the federal courts, making them late movers. Once a case is in the
federal system, the corporation may move to transfer the case to a different venue-that is, a
federal court elsewhere in the nation where it is subject to personal jurisdiction or where the acts
or omissions that gave rise to the lawsuit took place. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. For example, in one
well-known case, the settling plaintiffs first filed in Pennsylvania federal court, but upon
realizing that their case would be transferred to the forum of their competition in Illinois, they
re-filed in Delaware chancery. De Angelis v. Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., 641 A.2d 834, 836-
37 (Del. Ch. 1994).
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the chancery. Practitioners were the first to announce this trend, with
one prominent practitioner proclaiming that the new mantra among
plaintiffs seemed to be "Anywhere but Chancery."64 Academics have
recently confirmed aspects of the trend, although their findings
suggest that a more correct mantra may be "Chancery plus one or two
other places besides."65
In a thorough empirical study, John Armour, Bernard Black,
and Brian Cheffins documented the out-of-Delaware trend. They
found that the expansion of merger litigation has principally taken
place outside of Delaware: the proportion of such cases filed
exclusively in Delaware shrank, while the proportion filed both in
Delaware and in parallel jurisdictions or exclusively in other states
grew substantially.6 6 The incidence of Delaware companies being sued
only in Delaware declined substantially over the sample period from
over eighty percent in 1995 to an average of thirty-one percent in the
years 2005-2009.67 With regard to big M&A cases, a majority was filed
in Delaware until 2001, after which, with the exception of a single
year, a majority was filed in state courts other than Delaware.68 In
going-private transactions, too, a majority of cases is now brought
64. Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions,
M&A J., May 17, 2007, at 17-18 (quoting Ted Mirvis of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
observing the out-of-Delaware trend); LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 1-10 (prominent
plaintiffs'-side lawyers noting the out-of-Delaware trend and proposing solutions); Micheletti &
Parker, supra note 6, at 2-5, 35-47 (prominent litigators of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom noting trend and proposing solutions).
65. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 6 fig.3 (showing that challenges to the
same merger deals are moving forward in Delaware as well as other jurisdictions). In re
Diamond Foods, Inc. Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 7657-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2013), presents a
good example of this. Parallel suits were filed in both California state court and federal court.
When federal jurisdiction appeared to be in jeopardy, the federal plaintiffs filed a parallel suit in
Delaware, which chancery ultimately stayed in favor of the California action.
66. Armour, Black, and Cheffins tested the out-of-Delaware trend by analyzing four
datasets, involving: (1) corporate law opinions involving Delaware-incorporated companies
between 1995 and 2009; (2) filings relating to large M&A deals between 1994 and 2010; (3)
claims filed in going-private transactions between 1995 and 2010; and (4) derivatives suits filed
since 2005. Each of these analyses confirmed the out-of-Delaware trend. ABC, Losing Cases,
supra note 6, at 10-11, 13-14, 17-18, 20-21.
67. See ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1354 (based on an analysis of reported
opinions). As Delaware-only opinions declined, the authors found the percentage of opinions
written by federal judges increased steeply. Id. at 1355 fig. 2.
68. Id. at 1356-57, 1358 fig.4.
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outside of Delaware, typically in other state courts.69 Derivative suits
have also moved out of Delaware.7 0
Clearly plaintiffs are choosing to file claims in jurisdictions
other than Delaware.71 The question is: Why? Armour, Black, and
Cheffins focus on three explanatory factors: (1) increasing antipathy
expressed by the Delaware judiciary toward the plaintiffs' bar,72 (2)
Delaware's refusal to announce a clear standard for lead counsel
selection, thereby creating incentives for plaintiffs' firms to race to file
in a jurisdiction that will appoint them lead counsel on a simple first-
to-file basis,73 and (3) the strategic use of books and records requests
to acquire access to evidence in support of parallel federal securities
law class actions. 74 Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff focus on the
69. See id. at 1360-61, fig.7 (finding that the percentage of cases filed in Delaware declined
from seventy-three percent from 1997-2001 to forty-five percent in 2002-2009).
70. Id. at 1363 (stating that eleven percent of the derivative suits relating to options
backdating were filed in Delaware and only four out of 234 were filed exclusively in Delaware).
In a pair of studies focusing on derivative suits, Jessica Erickson finds that derivative suits have
"moved into the federal courts," largely as a result of being filed alongside parallel securities law
class actions. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis,
51 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1749, 1761-62 (2010); Erickson, supra note 61, at 64 (finding a high
percentage of parallel lawsuits filed in federal courts).
71. See, e.g., NYC BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 9 (explaining the trend by reference to the
"gamesmanship" of plaintiffs' lawyers); see also Anywhere But Chancery, supra note 64, at 17
(explaining the phenomenon by reference to plaintiffs' lawyers who "perceive that there is
greater settlement value outside of Delaware, that there's a greater vagary in the results, that
you never know what you're going to get"). Even plaintiffs' lawyers blame other plaintiffs'
lawyers. See LEBOVITCH ET. AL, supra note 15, at 4 (pointing to less established plaintiffs' firms
that seek to file quickly in hopes of being appointed lead counsel without regard for the
underlying merits of the claim). However, other commentators have attributed the out-of-
Delaware trend in part to the rise in business or commercial courts, which presumably would be
more expert in these matters. See Myers, supra note 6; see also Cain & Davidoff, Great Game,
supra note 6, at 4-5 (finding states with business courts seek to attract litigation); John F. Coyle,
Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918-21 (2012)
(describing the rise in business courts but arguing that the opportunities to divert litigation or
other economic benefits to new jurisdictions is limited).
72. ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1369 (emphasizing that this jaundiced view of the
plaintiffs' bar appears to be a "recent phenomenon"). A handful of major opinions offering a
sharply negative view of plaintiffs' lawyers, typically in dicta, but occasionally accompanied by a
reduction in fee awards, coincides with the out-of-Delaware trend. In response to these opinions,
the authors suggest, plaintiffs' lawyers have sought to take their cases elsewhere. Id. at 1369-70.
73. Id. at 1372-76.
74. ABC, Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 44-45. Discovery in securities law class actions is
frozen by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") until after the motion
to dismiss is heard, creating an incentive to use state law claims to generate access to evidence.
Because Delaware books and records actions may be more costly or difficult to win than books
and records actions under the laws of other states, the authors suggest that plaintiffs may have
an incentive whenever possible to file these derivative suits in other states. Id. at 49. Erickson,
meanwhile, focuses on the efficiencies of litigating derivative and related securities law claims in
a single forum, which must be federal given the underlying federal securities law. Erickson,
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twin variables of dismissal rates and attorneys' fees.7 5 Thomas and
Thompson, likewise, focus on the distribution of attorneys' fees.76
Regardless of the ultimate diagnosis, much of this prior commentary
decries the deleterious effects of the out-of-Delaware trend on
corporate law. Armour, Black, and Cheffins, for example, write that
the but-of-Delaware trend threatens "the viability of Delaware's Court
of Chancery's current status as 'the Mother Court of corporate law'
and Delaware's ability to retain its vice-like grip on incorporation
business."77
C. Which Court Stays and Which Proceeds
Given that for any large merger there are likely to be a number
of plaintiffs' attorneys filing several competing and fundamentally
related claims in multiple jurisdictions, the rules for determining
which of several competing forums will ultimately proceed with a
claim are of paramount importance. The application of these
procedural rules is within the discretion of each forum court.
In deciding whether to go forward, courts often claim to follow
the first-filed principle.78 Courts may also decline to follow the first-
supra note 61, at 68 ("There is nothing surprising about a derivative plaintiff filing a lawsuit in
the same court as multiple other related suits. Indeed, it would be more surprising if the
derivative plaintiff filed suit in Delaware when nearly all of the other litigation was in the
federal courts.").
75. Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 6 ("We ultimately conclude that the
dynamics of state competition for corporate litigation are driven by attorneys and desired fees or
expected settlements.").
76. See generally Thomas & Thompson, supra note 6, at 1757 (characterizing much
multijurisdictional deal litigation as "fee distribution litigation").
77. ABC, Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 25; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 751. In
their words:
In the short term, reducing Delaware's ability to rule on such cases would diminish its
attractiveness as the state of incorporation and reduce the income of Delaware's
corporate litigation bar, an important political constituency. In the long term, the
consequences would be even more drastic. Delaware law would be less developed (due
to the smaller number of cases), possibly become less coherent (due to the presence of
decisions decided by other courts), and its judiciary could lose part of its expertise (due
to the smaller number of cases heard).
Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 751; see also Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 10
(noting, more agnostically, that "the value of state law documented by [prior scholarly
commentary] could be affected either positively or negatively if Delaware and other states
compete by revising their law to attract corporate litigation").
78. See, e.g., McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281,
283 (Del. 1970) (holding that Delaware courts should "freely" use their discretion to stay actions
filed in Delaware where parallel actions have been filed in other jurisdictions). The McWane
doctrine is sometimes evoked to assert that Delaware should stay the suit in its jurisdiction so
that the first-filed suit can proceed. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007)
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filed principle in favor of an open-ended forum non conveniens
analysis.79 Although designed for contemporaneously filed actions,
courts have been willing to find that filings separated by as much as
seven days have been "simultaneously filed" in order to support the
more discretionary forum non conveniens analysis.80 The fiction of
simultaneous filing permits courts to conclude that even though a
claim was filed first in a competing jurisdiction, they may nevertheless
proceed to hear the claim. A line of cases in the Delaware Court of
Chancery directly rejects the first-filed rule for representative actions
in particular, because a case too quickly filed may indicate
irresponsible lawyering and, therefore, inadequate representation.8 1
(defendants moved to stay second-filed action in Delaware based on the McWane doctrine
arguing that the court should "use its broad discretion under the first-filed rule to grant a stay").
As a corollary, some Delaware courts have stated that if the action is first filed in Delaware, the
Delaware courts will allow it to proceed unless the choice "imposes overwhelming hardship on
the defendant." Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDIP Inc., 2005 WL 3277911, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23,
2005) (quoting United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Micro-Flo, LLC, 808 A.2d 761, 764 (Del. 2002)).
79. Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. 2006), sets forth the
following factors for the forum non conveniens analysis:
(1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for
witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view of the premises; (4) whether the controversy
is dependent upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more
properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction; (5) the pendency or
nonpendency of a similar action or actions in another jurisdiction; (6) all other
practical problems that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive.
Similar discretion exists in other jurisdictions. For example, New York courts may dismiss
overlapping cases on the basis of three factors: (1) in which jurisdiction litigation was first
commenced, (2) how far each litigation has progressed, and (3) which forum has a more
significant and substantive nexus to the controversy. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 791 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); see also White Light
Prods., Inc. v. On The Scene Prods., Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (stating
court which has first jurisdiction over the case should decide it unless special circumstances
warrant deviation).
80. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 116-17 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(three days apart); In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL
959992, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (one suit three days and one suit seven days apart).
81. See Dias v. Purches, Civil Action No. 7199-VCG, 2012 WL 689160, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar.
5, 2012) ("[W]hen there are multiple suits filed within a short time, this Court has tended to
employ a test similar to that used in addressing motions on forum non conveniens grounds, and
to consider whether the complaint in the competing jurisdiction is a better or fuller pleading
than the Delaware complaint."); In re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 957 (Del. Ch.
2007) ("Just as it has no substantial weight in determining who should be lead counsel in a
representative action, the fact that a particular plaintiff filed the first complaint in a wave of
hastily-crafted class action complaints attacking a just-announced transaction has no rational
force in determining where a motion to enjoin that transaction should be heard."); Biondi v.
Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1159 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("The mere fact that a lawyer filed first for a
representative client is scant evidence of his adequacy and may, in fact, support the contrary
inference."); see also Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 54 (arguing in favor of
considerations other than first filing in determining where a merger suit should proceed).
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The nightmare scenario arises when parties try to bring
motions to stay or dismiss parallel actions but both jurisdictions elect
to proceed. This situation arose in litigation stemming from the sale of
Topps, a publicly traded Delaware corporation headquartered in New
York that manufactures baseball cards. Within a day of each other,
plaintiffs filed a number of competing class actions in New York and
Delaware seeking to enjoin the merger.82 The defendants first sought
to stay the New York action in favor of Delaware, but the New York
court denied their motion.83 Having been rebuffed in New York, the
defendants turned to Delaware and sought a stay from that court so
that the litigation would proceed in only one forum.84 The Delaware
court also refused to stay proceedings.85 As a result, the litigation
proceeded simultaneously in New York and Delaware until the parties
ultimately settled.86 Topps may present a rare case, but it does
illustrate the difficulty of achieving cross jurisdictional coordination
under the current regime.87
Adding a third layer of complexity, there are doctrinal limits on
the ability of federal courts to stay parallel proceedings in favor of
state suits.88 A federal court is supposed to grant a stay in favor of
82. Topps, 924 A.2d at 953; In re The Topps Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007
WL 5018882, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. June 8, 2007).
83. Topps, 924 A.2d at 953. The New York court denied the motion, among other reasons
because (1) the action was first filed in New York, (2) the merger agreement chose New York as
the forum and the governing law, (3) Topps was headquartered in New York, and (4) the bulk of
the discovery was to take place in New York. In re The Topps Co., 2007 WL 5018882, at *3-4.
84. Topps, 924 A.2d at 953.
85. Id.
86. Settlement, as a result of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, stops parallel proceedings,
but it does not stop disputes over fees. In Allion Healthcare, for example, parallel lawsuits were
proceeding in both Delaware and New York until the case was settled in Delaware, at which time
the question arose as to how to split attorneys' fees between Delaware and New York counsel. In
re Allion Healthcare Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar.
29, 2011). Ultimately, the chancery court favored the settling plaintiff, awarding the New York
lawyers a portion of the disclosure fee because they continued to litigate the case in parallel to
the Delaware case until the final Delaware settlement. Id. at *6-7. The court refused to split a
much larger portion of the fee arising out of the increase in share price because "New York
plaintiffs had an opportunity to sign on to the settlement, which they declined to do." Id. at *8.
87. See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011
WL 2028076, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) (discussing procedural history of case); Micheletti &
Parker, supra note 6, at 1 (examining problems of multijurisdictional litigation). But see In re
Compellent Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *29 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 9, 2011) (warning plaintiffs that if they insisted on proceeding in the other jurisdiction,
"what you're likely to get from [Vice Chancellor Laster] is Topps II"); infra note 234 and
accompanying text (discussing Allion Healthcare, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 n.12, which presented
the same dual-discovery situation as Topps but settled before the preliminary injunction motion).
88. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 (1976)
(noting that in determining whether to stay a federal action in favor of a parallel state action,
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parallel state litigation only in exceptional circumstances. 89 The mere
pendency of a parallel action is not enough; the federal court must find
something more in order to stay the action.90 In application, however,
the standard has been unpredictable. Some district courts have been
willing to stay federal deal litigation in favor of Delaware, and others
have not.9'
Finally, it is important to remember that courts are not passive
players in forum competition. A significant factor in deciding whether
to stay or proceed with the case is the development of the proceeding.
A court can influence the outcome of the motion to stay in the parallel
proceeding by allowing the case before it to move forward
expeditiously.92 Similarly, a court diminishes the chance that the
competing court will grant a stay by not moving forward quickly.
These tactics give some control to courts seeking to retain, or to cede,
power over the litigation.
II. PERFECT AND IMPERFECT MARKETS
In the system of litigation outlined above, competing groups of
plaintiffs shape the claim by choosing what to allege and where to file.
Defendants control settlement by deciding what they are willing to
federal courts are to give substantial weight to the "heavy obligation" of the federal courts to
exercise their jurisdiction).
89. See id. ("[Wie do not overlook the heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction."); 17A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247 (3d ed. 2012) ("[I]n
most cases neither stay nor dismissal will be proper and the federal court will be obliged to
exercise its jurisdiction.").
90. McMurray v. De Vink, 27 F. App'x 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2002).
91. Compare Telesco v. Telesco Fuel & Masons' Materials, Inc., 765 F.2d 356, 359 (2d Cir.
1985) (granting dismissal of federal action in favor of state proceeding and noting particularly
the investment and length of the parallel state suit), and In re Countrywide Fin. Corp.
Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting as factors favoring a stay
under Colorado River the Delaware court's expertise, the fact that it obtained jurisdiction
immediately after the merger was announced, and the fact that expedited discovery was
proceeding and a preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled in Delaware), with McMurray,
27 F. App'x at 92 (overturning stay although litigation was proceeding apace in Delaware), and
La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Medco Health Solutions Inc., C.A. No. 2:11-cv-
4211(DMC)(MF), 2011 WL 4386774, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2011) (refusing to grant stay based
on Delaware's expertise in corporate law where progress in both cases was "negligible"), and
Lasker v. UBS Sec. LLC, 614 F. Supp. 2d 345, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (declining to stay case in
favor of Tennessee action).
92. See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *9 (awarding expedited discovery in
a case involving a question of first impression under Delaware law so that the competing
jurisdiction, Illinois, would be more likely to stay proceedings). But see In re Allion Healthcare
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (granting
expedited discovery but failing to induce other jurisdiction to stay); In re The Topps Co. S'holders
Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same).
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pay for preclusive effect. This basic dynamic suggests that a market
mechanism is at play in the disposition of merger claims.
Exploring the market analogy may explain the patterns
observed in merger litigation. In framing the question in this way,
however, we do not mean to imply a laissez-faire approach. Rather,
understanding the settlement process as a market illuminates defects
alongside benefits. For example, the market analogy highlights the
ways in which opportunistic conduct may distort the price-discovery
function and thereby harm the shareholders whose interests are
supposedly represented in the litigation. In the sections that follow,
we examine the benefits and costs of the market for preclusion,
looking at it in both idealized and real-world forms. We also describe
some of the positive spillover effects of the market. This inquiry will
ultimately inform the normative analysis of the next Part.
A. A Well-Working Market for Preclusion
In a well-working market for preclusion, attorneys serve their
clients' objectives. 93 In other words, we assume for present purposes
that lawyer interests are generally aligned with those of their clients.
With this simplifying assumption, it is possible to see several features
of the out-of-Delaware trend in merger litigation as mechanisms
designed to create leverage for each side and to price and process
shareholder claims efficiently. We relax this assumption in the
subsequent discussion.
1. Sell-Side Leverage: Pressure Through Procedure
It has long been recognized that plaintiffs' attorneys sometimes
use forum selection to increase the value of their clients' claims.94 In
the context of merger litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers may also look for
the jurisdiction with the most favorable procedural rules in order to
maximize their chances of success in the litigation and thereby
increase the value of their clients' claims in settlement. In general,
these are procedural rules that create greater leverage for plaintiffs
93. This does not mean they are motivated by altruism. They seek to maximize their own
welfare, but they do so as professionals, maximizing their own return by serving their clients
well. Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2092-93 (2004)
(describing mixed motives of lawyers who seek both wealth and to advance the public good).
94. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979) (defining forum shopping as "[t]he
practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard");
Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 340-42 (2006) (noting that critiques
of forum-selection practices have particularly focused on plaintiffs).
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vis-A-vis defendants. We refer to these rules as "pressuring rules."
Later, we contrast them with "positioning rules," those rules that
govern the distribution of control over the litigation and any fee
awards among plaintiffs' attorneys.95 Examples of pressuring rules
include a forum's rules granting litigants access to information, rules
about whether and when injunctive relief may be awarded, and rules
about who the decisionmaker will be.
a. Access to Information
Access to information is governed by discovery practice. Rules
about the timing of discovery, what information must be produced and
what information must be protected all inform the choice of forum.
We address each in turn.
The first advantage that plaintiffs seek in merger litigation is
expedited discovery. This discovery is necessary in order for the
plaintiff to file a motion for a preliminary injunction, which in turn
will typically determine the outcome of the lawsuit in this context. If
competing actions have been filed, the action that is proceeding apace
is most likely to position the prosecuting plaintiffs' lawyers as leaders
in the litigation. These lead lawyers control the case's future and
assure their entitlement to the bulk of the fees.96 Expedited discovery
in state court gives the plaintiffs an additional benefit by providing
the information necessary to file a suit in federal court under the
restrictive pleading requirements imposed by the PSLRA. 97
95. These are not airtight categories. Overlap exists, for example, in the rules awarding
control of the litigation, which can affect both attorneys' fees as well as leverage at settlement.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 908-09, 916-17 (1987) (discussing
allocation of property rights over expected fee award); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1991) (discussing incentives to align
interests of attorney and client). Nevertheless, the central distinction-between rules that are
purely distributional in nature as opposed to those that can be used to increase the value of a
claim-emphasizes the point that at least some of the procedural gamesmanship that goes on in
merger litigation is not merely designed to get one group of lawyers a larger share of the pie at
the expense of another group of lawyers, but rather enables well-meaning counsel to obtain
better outcomes for their clients. See generally Thomas & Thompson, supra note 6, at 1757
(characterizing much multijurisdictional deal litigation as "fee distribution litigation").
96. Note that as part of the fee calculation, the court will consider the "vigor" with which
the firm pursued the litigation, including discovery. TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia
Commc'n, Inc., No. 18336, 18289, 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000).
97. In cases brought under the PSLRA in federal court, the court will stay the litigation if
the defendant intends to file a motion to dismiss until that motion is decided, so that for these
cases (which must be filed in federal court) there is a significant procedural drawback for
plaintiffs. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). This means plaintiffs must meet the higher
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In Delaware, the plaintiff must bring a request for expedited
discovery by motion and must show "good cause."98 To establish good
cause, Delaware courts require a showing close to what is required in
the preliminary injunction context-irreparable harm, weighing of the
interests, and burdens on the parties and the public interest-only
without having to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of success on
the merits.99 A defendant corporation that loses in its opposition to
expedited discovery will not necessarily lose again on plaintiffs motion
for a preliminary injunction. Nevertheless, a grant of expedited
discovery is likely to encourage settlement for two reasons. 00 First,
expedited discovery means a preliminary injunction motion is likely to
be heard, and there is nothing like a deadline to trigger negotiations.
Second, forced sharing of information encourages settlement by giving
both sides a more accurate sense of the merits of the case. If the
plaintiff is unable to obtain expedited discovery, the defendant will be
in a much stronger bargaining position because it is unlikely that the
plaintiff will be able to obtain a preliminary injunction.101
Not every jurisdiction has a rigorous standard for expedited
discovery. For example, New York has no specific expedited-discovery
standards. A request for expedited discovery in New York ordinarily
accompanies a motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants can
resist expedition by arguing that monetary relief will be sufficient
compensation for any injury suffered by the plaintiff.102 The New York
pleading standards without the benefit of discovery in the extant case, and renders discovery
obtained from other litigation, particularly litigation in state courts, especially useful.
98. In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., C.A. No. 6301-VCP, 2011 WL
2410395, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2011); Raymond Revocable Trust v. MAT Five LLC, C.A. No.
3843-VCL, 2008 WL 2673341, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2008) (quoting In re SunGard Data Sys.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 1221-N, 2005 WL 1653975, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2005)).
99. See K-Sea, 2011 WL 2410395, at *5 (noting that in deciding whether to expedite
discovery, the court will determine " 'whether . . . the plaintiff has articulated a sufficiently
colorable claim and shown a sufficient possibility of a threatened irreparable injury, as would
justify imposing on the defendants and the public the extra (and sometimes substantial) costs of
an expedited preliminary injunction proceeding' " (quoting Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., Civ. A. No. 13845, 1994 WNL 672698, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov 15, 1994)); see also TCW Tech.,
2000 WNL 1478537, at *2 (noting that the "colorable claim" standard for expedited discovery is
lower than the likelihood of success standard that applies for preliminary injunctions).
100. See Olson v. EV3, Inc., CA. No. 5583-VCL, 2011 WL 704409, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21,
2011) (case settled shortly after court granted motion for expedited discovery); In re Colt Indus.
S'holder Litig., 553 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (parties settled case while
expedited discovery was underway).
101. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012) (denying
preliminary injunction in spite of express finding that El Paso's sale process may have been
tainted by conflicts of interest affecting the company's CEO and financial advisors).
102. 4B N.Y. PRACTICE, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 80:33 (3d ed.
2011).
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courts impose no formal requirement of sufficiency of the complaint or
a weighing of the burdens and benefits for the parties and the state.103
Obtaining expedited discovery in New York may be somewhat easier
for a plaintiff who can make a convincing argument that the merger is
imminent and likely to cause harm that is not monetarily
compensable. This in turn increases the plaintiffs' leverage in
settlement negotiations.
The federal courts are inconsistent in their treatment of
expedited discovery.104 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
provide a specific standard for expediting discovery or engaging in
early discovery, so federal courts take a variety of approaches to
expediting discovery. Some federal courts adhere to a loose
"reasonableness" test.105 Other courts subject such motions to a "good
cause" standard.106 Still other federal courts are even more wary of
granting expedited discovery.107 Accordingly, plaintiffs have an
103. Factors such as those considered in Delaware may theoretically be taken into account
by a New York court ruling on a motion for expedited discovery, but our research has revealed no
cases that considered these factors in the merger context.
104. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a moratorium on formal discovery until the
parties confer, submit a written discovery plan to the court, and attend a court conference about
that plan. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d) (requiring a moratorium on discovery until parties have
conferred pursuant to Rule 26(f)); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to confer and submit
written discovery plan); FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring judge to set a scheduling order).
105. Considerations include: "(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the
breadth of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the
burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical
discovery process the request was made." In re Fannie Mae Derivative Litig., 227 F.R.D. 142, 143
(D.D.C. 2005).
106. Dimension Data North America, Inc. v. NetStar-1, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 528, 531 (E.D.N.C.
2005) (rejecting the more stringent standard of Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. O'Connor, 194 F.R.D. 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2000):
[W]here, as here, a plaintiff seeks expedited discovery in order to prepare for a
preliminary injunction hearing, it does not make sense to use preliminary injunction
analysis factors to determine the propriety of an expedited discovery request.
Rather, ... it makes sense to examine the discovery request, as we have done, on the
entirety of the record to date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all of
the surrounding circumstances ....
(emphasis omitted).The lenient interpretation is supported by a Committee Note, which suggests
that early discovery is appropriate in cases involving preliminary injunctions. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee's note (1993).
107. In Notaro, the Southern District of New York held that in order to impose expedited
discovery:
[C]ourts should require the plaintiff to demonstrate (1) irreparable injury, (2) some
probability of success on the merits, (3) some connection between the expedited
discovery and the avoidance of the irreparable injury, and (4) some evidence that the
injury that will result without expedited discovery looms greater than the injury that
the defendant will suffer if the expedited relief is granted.
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incentive to maintain their suit in some but not all federal
jurisdictions if they hope to win expedited discovery.
Related to access to expedited discovery is the more general
issue of access to information in discovery. Different jurisdictions
provide different levels of access to information. Defendants may
assert privileges in Delaware that may not be available elsewhere. For
example, the Delaware chancery court recognizes a business-strategy
immunity that is not recognized by all jurisdictions. 08 This immunity
protects strategies being contemplated by the company on an ongoing
basis, but not plans that have already been made.109 The purpose of
this immunity is to allow the company to "shield itself from discovery
of time-sensitive information in the takeover context, including
delicate financial information, defensive strategies, and potential
responses to hostile bids."" 0 Similar protective orders are available in
federal court,"' but because the federal courts have not recognized the
immunity as part of state substantive law they will not automatically
apply it. Other jurisdictions may not recognize the immunity or may
limit its applicability, thus allowing plaintiffs to conduct broader
discovery than would be available in Delaware.112
95 F.R.D. at 405; see also Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (holding that merely seeking a preliminary injunction does not automatically expedite
discovery).
108. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 454, 456-57 (D. Del. 1988) (discussing business
strategy immunity). Some call this a "white knight privilege," but the federal courts have
rejected this characterization and found it to be a procedural rule similar to the attorney-client
privilege. Id.
109. Pfizer Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No. Civ.A.17524, 1999 WL 33236240, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 8, 1999).
110. Id.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 457 ('The scope of the protection to
be afforded white knight documents is determined by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
112. Another method for obtaining information about a corporate defendant that may be
easier to achieve outside of Delaware is a books and records action. Under Delaware law,
stockholders have the right to inspect the books and records of the corporation in which they hold
stock and to sue for enforcement of this right. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2012). This
type of suit may be useful for plaintiffs contemplating other actions, such as securities actions in
federal court under the PSLRA. The chancery court attempted to limit this tactic by dismissing
books and records actions where the plaintiffs had already filed a derivative suit. The Delaware
Supreme Court overturned the chancery court's holdings, ruling that even if a plaintiff had filed
a preexisting derivative suit he could still go forward with the books and records action. King v.
VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011). It is possible to conclude from this that
the Delaware chancery court is wary of books and records actions and will use its discretion to
limit them where possible.
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b. Preliminary Injunctions: Timing and Availability
A preliminary injunction motion with a strong chance of
success will exert pressure on the defendant, but so will the mere
filing of a motion where the outcome is unpredictable. In merger
litigation, uncertainty benefits plaintiffs. 113 Pressure on defendants to
settle builds once hearings are scheduled on motions with
unpredictable outcomes that put the transaction in jeopardy. This is
especially so in jurisdictions where courts may schedule preliminary
injunction hearings without an informal preview of the merits of the
claim.
The standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction is
essentially the same in most jurisdictions. 1 1 4 Because the
interpretation of the standard depends on the individual judge and his
or her familiarity with the underlying transaction and the relevant
law, filing outside of Delaware may dramatically increase the
unpredictability of outcomes. This uncertainty may increase the
plaintiffs' leverage in settlement negotiations, especially if a
preliminary injunction hearing can be scheduled early in the process.
Courts differ over when in the litigation process preliminary
injunction motions should be heard. Delaware courts tend to refrain
from scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing until after the proxy
has issued to avoid multiple preliminary injunction motions.115 Other
jurisdictions, such as California, have recently adopted similar
rules. 16 Plaintiffs may prefer to file in jurisdictions that have not
113. This is so because defendants, eager to go forward with their transaction, value the
certainty of knowing that they will be able to do so. Decreasing certainty in litigation increases
the amount that defendants may be willing to pay in settlement to achieve transactional
certainty. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart"And "Blackmail" Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1404 (2000).
114. In Delaware, the standard requires the moving party to demonstrate "(1) a reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the merits at trial; (2) that the failure to issue a preliminary
injunction will result in immediate and irreparable injury before the final hearing; and (3) that
the balance of hardships weighs in the movant's favor." La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v.
Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1185 (Del. Ch. 2007). In the federal courts, "[a] plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). It is possible that "likelihood of success" on the merits may be a more
difficult standard to meet in some cases than the Delaware "reasonable probability" of success
standard.
115. Telephone Interview with Stuart Grant, Senior Partner, Grant & Eisenhofer (Jan. 6,
2012).
116. Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Oakley, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1542,
1545-47 (2010).
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adopted this approach because doing so permits them to put greater
pressure on the defendant earlier in the litigation.
c. Type of Decisionrmaker
A third category of pressuring rule concerns the type of
decisionmaker available in different forums. In Delaware, judges of
the court of chancery decide cases concerning corporate law. This
tight-knit group of judges, often former corporate lawyers, is deeply
familiar with the relevant issues.117 In other jurisdictions,
adjudicators deciding cases concerning Delaware corporations may be
generalist life-tenured judges, elected judges, or juries.118
It is an understatement to say that juries are less predictable
with regard to corporate law matters than chancery court judges.
Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, including federal court, plaintiffs
have a right to a jury trial for some claims that might be brought in
merger litigation.119 The additional volatility of outcome alone, apart
from any suspicions regarding the jury's supposed sympathies in
corporate cases, may provide plaintiffs with sufficient reason to file in
jurisdictions where juries are available.120 Even where a jury trial is
117. See, e.g., Delaware - Law Firms A Senior Corporate Practitioner Looks at the Leadership
Role of the Deleware Judiciary, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2004),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/4767/delaware-law-firms-senior-corporate-
practitioner-looks-leadership-role-delaware-judici; Ronald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III,
The History of Delaware's Business Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, A.B.A. Bus. L. SEC.
(Mar./Apr. 2008), http://apps.americanbar.orgbuslawlblt/2008-03-04/slights.shtml.
118. For example, superior court judges in California are elected to six-year terms. CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 16(b).
119. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1970) (holding that stockholders in a
derivative suit alleging breach of contract and gross negligence were entitled to a jury trial in
federal court). The availability of a jury under the Seventh Amendment in general is a complex
question beyond the scope of this Article, as is the question of the extent to which the Seventh
Amendment is even applicable to those internal corporate matters to which Delaware law
applies. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 450-69 (1996) (holding
that New York's standard for remittitur applies in federal diversity action); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial
in federal court on diversity action because the jury trial is an "essential characteristic" of the
federal system). It is important to remember that only a judge can decide a preliminary
injunction motion, the main vehicle for decision in merger litigation. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 65
("The court may issue a preliminary injunction. . . .").
120. See, e.g., Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDIP Inc., No. Civ.A. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) (in rejecting plaintiffs' motion to stay Delaware suit in favor of an
Ohio suit set for trial, the court condemned the plaintiffs' "blatant forum shopping in search of a
jury trial"); see also NRG Barriers, Inc. v. Jelin, No. 15013, 1996 WL 377014, at *6 (Del. Ch. July
31, 1996) (refusing to stay in favor of a California proceeding where "an outstanding request for a
jury trial and a claim for punitive damages" made it unlikely that the case could be heard before
the merger deadline).
1080
2013] THE MARKET FOR PRECLUSION 1081
not available, there are many levels of judicial experience and
expertise-from elected judges to appointed judges to life-tenured
federal judges-that may bear on the outcome of a particular suit.
Experienced litigators will know where to file to maximize their
advantage vis-A-vis defendants. 121
2. Buy-Side Leverage: Monopsony
On the defense side, the principal interest is to settle merger
litigation swiftly-and at the lowest possible cost-so that the
transaction may proceed as planned. The plaintiffs ability to file
merger litigation in more than one jurisdiction thus presents an
obvious cost since it is more expensive to litigate a case in two (or
three) places than in only one.122 From the defendant's perspective,
however, the greatest increase in costs likely arises from the potential
of additional claims to create delay and uncertainty.123 Delay creates
transaction risk because deals that are delayed may fall apart. 124 More
fundamentally, uncertainty over legal rulings creates uncertainty over
whether the transaction will close.125 Because defendants value
transactional certainty, they will be willing to pay more in settlement
to avoid these risks. 126
121. See, e.g., O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 17, at 8 (describing how particular Illinois
counties get more than their share of class action tort filings).
122. At the very least, multiple lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions will increase billable hours
on the defense side, increasing an already significant source of cost. For example, one lawyer told
us that defense fees for a preliminary injunction motion in 2011 could run to as much as $1.5
million. Interview with mergers and acquisitions lawyer at a prominent New York law firm who
represents defendants (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Mergers and Acquisitions
Lawyer].
123. Typical defense work at this stage largely consists of filing answers and making
motions, the substance of which will be essentially the same across jurisdictions. Moreover,
lawyers tell us that many of the actions filed in competing forums are really "shadow" suits that
are not actively litigated and do not therefore substantially increase defense costs but rather are
filed as placeholders so that plaintiffs' lawyers can subsequently demand to be included in the
settlement. Id.
124. This is an argument defendants raise in opposition to preliminary injunctions. See, e.g.,
Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104 (Del. Ch. 2007) (rejecting
defendant's argument that delay will jeopardize the transaction and granting preliminary
injunction).
125. Uncertainty is a core advantage to plaintiffs of each of the pressuring rules described
above. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the advantages of uncertainty for plaintiffs).
126. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 1402 ("Risk averse parties will pay a premium
to avoid taking a gamble."); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected
Value Of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1295 (2006)
(demonstrating that volatility of outcomes increases settlement size).
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In spite of these increased costs, facing multiple claims in
multiple jurisdictions also creates an important opportunity for
defendants: the chance to be the sole buyer in a market with multiple
sellers.127 Because a judicially approved settlement with any of these
plaintiffs would have preclusive effect over all others,128 and because
there is no formal means of coordinating or consolidating the
plaintiffs' claims across jurisdictional boundaries,12 9 defendants have a
structural advantage. They can "shop" for the quickest and cheapest
settlement from the various plaintiffs' teams.130 This is monopsony
power and it drives down the cost of settlement.11 In an effort to
provide further certainty to the transacting parties, defendants may
also demand that the settling plaintiffs' counsel obtain agreement
from all competing counsel as part of the overall settlement.132 Thus,
although multiforum litigation may marginally increase defense costs,
it also creates monopsony power and clears a path to the principal
defense-side benefit-transactional certainty.
Leading commentators criticize the monopsony power of
defendants in the settlement of class actions133 because it enables
127. In the words of Vice Chancellor Laster: "[D]efense lawyers benefit from this game,
too. . . . They . . . get a cheap settlement for their client. . . . [Diefendants can play multiple
plaintiffs against each other to create the reverse-auction effect." Transcript of Courtroom Status
Conference at 19, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/uploads/file/int53%281%29.pdf.
128. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause).
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. Having identified the lowest-cost settlement, defendants may deploy a number of
procedural tactics to move that complaint forward ahead of others. For example, defendants may
stipulate to class certification, agree to an expedited schedule, or provide preferential access to
documents. They can also move for a stay or dismissal in one jurisdiction and not another.
LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 2 ("Defendants may seek to advance the procedural status of
the litigation pursued by counsel less likely to litigate and thereby avoid more aggressive
members of the shareholders' bar.").
131. In economic theory, monopsony power leads to a redistribution of welfare from the seller
to the buyer as well as deadweight loss through underproduction of the good sold. See generally
ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS (2003). In
our view, however, the potential for deadweight loss is constrained by objectors and the judicial-
approval mechanism discussed immediately below. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying
text.
132. See infra text accompanying note 197.
133. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-72 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The
Inadequate Search for 'Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) ("By indicating that they will deal with class counsel who is willing to
settle for the least, [defendants] implicitly create a 'reverse auction' in which competing class
lawyers 'underbid' each other in order to have their own action settled first and earn attorneys'
fees."); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,
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them to conduct a "reverse auction."134 As a result, claims may be
undervalued and plaintiffs undercompensated. 135 This is not an
inevitable consequence, however. Plaintiffs' lawyers, after all, would
prefer to settle for a larger recovery rather than a small one and may
wish to cultivate and maintain a reputation for good results. 136 A
skeptic might counter that plaintiffs' firms operating on the basis of
volume are unlikely to care about maximizing the value of any one
claim and that at least some plaintiffs' firms seem to care not at all for
their reputations. These types of plaintiffs' lawyers, even if they are in
the minority overall, feed into the reverse auction mechanism, leading
to the undervaluing of claims and the undercompensation of the
plaintiff class. But there are two important structural mechanisms to
keep everyone honest: judicial review of settlements and the potential
for objectors.
Judicial approval is necessary for the settlement of merger
litigation. 137 Before granting approval, judges review the fairness of
the settlement for the class, during which time they may be able to
assess whether plaintiffs' lawyers have in fact sold out the interests of
the class they supposedly represent. 138 Commentators point to
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1995) (describing allegations of breach of fiduciary duty to
future class members in an asbestos settlement class action).
134. In the article in which he coined the term, Professor Coffee wrote:
[I]t allows the defendants to pick and choose the plaintiff team with which they will
deal. Indeed, it signals to the unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorney that by filing a
parallel, shadow action in state court, it can underbid the original plaintiffs' attorney
team that researched, prepared and filed the action. The net result is that defendants
can seek the lowest bidder from among these rival groups and negotiate with each
simultaneously.
Coffee, supra note 133, at 1371-72.
135. See John C. Coffee Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, Rule of Law: The Latest Class Action Scam,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 11 (discussing how defendants facing overlapping class action suits
in multiple forums can play plaintiffs' attorneys off each other in order to obtain the cheapest
settlement possible).
136. They may prefer higher-value settlements to lower-value ones if only because it is
therefore easier to justify significant attorneys' fees. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying
text. Likewise, a reputation for good results might help a plaintiffs' firm win lead plaintiff status
in a leadership dispute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(ii) (considering counsel's experience in handling
class actions as a factor in favor of awarding class counsel status).
137. The federal class action rule requires judicial approval for any disposition of a class
action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). State courts ordinarily have similar rules. See, e.g., DEL. CH. R. 23(e)
(requiring judicial approval for dismissal or compromise of a class action); In re Triarc Cos. Class
& Derivative Litig., 791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001) (asking whether the settlement is "fair and
reasonable in light of all relevant factors").
138. At certification, the judge is charged with determining that the class meets the
requirements of the class action rule, including adequacy of representation and of class counsel.
Settlement approvals are often filed together with motions for class certification, but the
requirements of the rule still need to be met even when a settlement has been reached, with the
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factors-such as limited bargaining and nonpecuniary relief-that
judges might consider in making this determination.139 Information
asymmetry, however, presents a significant obstacle to judges
engaging in this inquiry.140 The potential for collusion compounds the
problem of information asymmetry; settling attorneys on each side
mask what actually happened in the settlement process, making the
negotiations seem harder fought than in fact they were.141
Fortunately, there is a mechanism to revitalize the adversarial
process and reveal information in this critical review process: the
potential of class members to object.
In connection with the judicial approval process, the parties
give all shareholders notice of the prospective settlement, and the
court provides dissatisfied shareholders with an opportunity to
object.142 Yet in many class action contexts research has shown that
would-be objectors tend to be indifferent or uninformed and therefore
exception of the requirement that money damages class actions be manageable for litigation. See
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-20 (1997).
139. Professors Macey and Miller suggest a list of "yellow flags" including:
[S] ettlement bargaining limited to one of the competing groups of plaintiffs' attorneys;
settlement with the group of attorneys who present a less substantial threat of
carrying the case forward to trial . . . award of lucrative and potentially justified
attorneys' fees; and sudden expansion of the scope of the settled case (for example, by
converting the action from a statewide to a nationwide class).
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 167, 191-92 (2009), quoted in Brief of Spec. Counsel at 26, Scully v. Nighthawk
Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011). A similar list is offered in
a guide for judges, focusing on three factors suggesting collusion: (1) "an imbalance between the
cash value of the settlement to the class as a whole and the amount of attorney fees in the
agreement," (2) "a difference between the apparent value of the class claims on the merits and
the value of the settlement to the class members," and (3) settlement "with an attorney who has
not been involved in litigating the class claims that other attorneys have been pursuing."
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAs E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14 (1st ed. 2005).
140. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1272
(1995) (describing settlement process as a "black box" precluding serious judicial scrutiny); G.
Donald Puckett, Peering Into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representation for
Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1279-83 (1999) (describing serious judicial
review of class settlements as "inherently futile").
141. The reverse auction is a kind of collusive-settlement practice. Macey & Miller, supra
note 139, at 191-94. Collusion, of course, can produce process as well as result.
142. Typical objectors are class members who are unhappy with some aspect of the
settlement and file papers with the court stating their grounds for dissatisfaction, thereby
reinserting an adversarial element in the approval process. It is a question of serious dispute,
however, whether typical objectors effectively guarantee fair settlements or merely represent yet
another hold-out demanding a share of the settlement pie. See generally Edward Brunet, Class
Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403,
403; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1640-66
(2010) (proposing solutions to address objector blackmail of settlements).
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unlikely to mount a substantive challenge to the settlement.143
Multijurisdictional merger litigation, however, presents an especially
ripe environment for objectors. Many would-be objectors are already
represented by counsel who may be both knowledgeable about the
claim and frustrated at having effectively been undersold in the
reverse auction. Moreover, because merger litigation often settles for
attorneys' fees and nonpecuniary relief, would-be objectors may often
have a strong basis for arguing that the class has been underserved by
its supposed representatives.144 Frustrated plaintiffs' teams wishing to
upset the settlement in hopes ultimately of taking control of the action
and reopening negotiations with defendants thus have a strong
incentive to object, at least when the settlement award seriously
undervalues the claim.145
This incentive to object serves to restore the adversarial
process in an otherwise collusive environment by inserting a monitor
and revealing important information about the value of the settlement
to the judge charged with approving or rejecting it.146 Judges should
take this information seriously and reject settlements that appear
inadequate.14 7 The settling parties could be expected to internalize
these incentives and avoid concluding settlements that could not
withstand the scrutiny of motivated objectors. In this way, the price-
discovery function of the market could be trusted to provide for the
143. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1533-34, 1550 (2004)
(showing that the objection rate is low across case types); see also Brunet, supra note 142, at
412-14 (noting that typical objectors are not active participants in the litigation or settlement
and are therefore uninformed).
144. Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 926 (Del. 1994) (remanding settlement for more
rigorous inquiry into inadequacy of representation based on objector appeal).
145. Objectors may mount a formal leadership challenge in order to pursue the claim
themselves or merely to alter the terms of the settlement, thereby entitling the attorneys to fees.
See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension, Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 417-20 (Del. 2009) (denying fees to
objectors based on failure to increase shareholder value). Judges have wide latitude in dealing
with objectors. See, e.g., Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., C.A. No. 1091-VCL, 2012 WL
1655538, at *3-8 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2012) (offering objectors the option to take over the case if they
post a bond in the amount of the disputed settlement amount, but otherwise approving the
settlement).
146. See Brunet, supra note 142, at 408-09 ("Informational input from objectors regarding a
proposed settlement could, in theory, improve the monitoring problem. By definition, the objector
is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed settlement and then investing resources to either
improve the settlement terms or reject the settlement.").
147. See infra Part III.B.1. (specifying how judges can stimulate objectors in order to police
opportunism in the market for preclusion).
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swift processing of low-value claims while also preventing high-value
claims from being undervalued. 14 8
B. Imperfections in the Market for Preclusion
Here we relax the (perhaps naive) simplifying assumption that
attorneys are generally motivated to serve their clients' best interests,
thus allowing for the prospect of litigation agency costs. 149 Taking
these agency costs into account, it is easy to see how the outcomes of
the market for preclusion can be distorted through both the
proliferation of low-value claims and potential transformation of high-
value claims into low-value settlements.150 We describe the potential
for attorney opportunism and the distortions it introduces below.
148. The reverse auction does not raise the same policy issues in the context of deal litigation
as it does in the context of mass torts, in which the bulk of the critical scholarly commentary
arose. Most notably, much of the scholarly focus on reverse auctions in the context of mass torts
has been on the problem of future claimants-that is, those whose injuries are not presently
known and who are therefore not present to object but whose rights are nevertheless decided by
the settlement. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 133, at 1360-62 (describing defense-side incentive to
settle early, before the extent of injuries is fully known, in order to be able to provide a low
estimate of the cost of future claims). But there are no future claimants in merger litigation,
where all class members are known (i.e., all target shareholders at the time of the merger) and
participate ratably in the settlement. Likewise, the concern that plaintiffs' lawyers will fail to
pursue socially valuable deterrence objectives by settling rather than seeking punitive damages
is not as forceful in the deal litigation context, where punitive damages are not available. As
regards compensatory objectives, the class settlement is not the merger plaintiffs' only hope for
relief as it is in the context of mass torts: unsatisfied shareholders still have the right to vote no
and thereby prevent consummation of the merger and, often, the right to sue for appraisal ex
post to increase the consideration paid in the deal.
149. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of
Representative Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 154
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (noting that "representative litigation
introduces factors that can put daylight between the interests of lawyers and investors").
150. A persistent problem in this area is that commentators complain both about the
proliferation of meritless litigation and the potential stifling of meritorious claims. We are
agnostic on the question of the merits of merger litigation, adopting the view that some merger
claims have merit, while others do not. Overall we assume that a legal regime permitting merger
litigation is socially desirable. The problem, thus, is one of identifying and screening these
claims. The market mechanisms we identify, adjusted by the policy interventions we identify in
Part III below, strike us as a good screening mechanism. The market can limit the cost of
meritless litigation by permitting cheap settlements while also rewarding enterprising plaintiffs'
attorneys who litigate meritorious cases aggressively and who object to underpriced settlements.
In other words, whether the concern is the proliferation of meritless litigation or the systematic
underpricing of shareholder claims, a well-working market for preclusion provides a good
solution. To the extent that merger litigation extracts rent from shareholders, this is a matter for
the substantive law. In this sense, we disagree with Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note
54, at 26, who criticize our thesis and argue that venue and jurisdictional rules are the best way
to eliminate needless costs for shareholders resulting from merger litigation.
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1. Sell-Side Opportunism
The theoretical divergence between the interests of plaintiffs'
lawyers and the class they represent is well documented in the
literature.16 ' In the context of multijurisdictional merger litigation,
plaintiffs' lawyers may file strategically in order to take advantage of
procedural "positioning" rules that benefit their own interests more
than client interests.152 Examples of positioning rules include rules for
determining control of the litigation and awarding and allocating
attorneys' fees. Such rules can motivate filings, leading to a
proliferation of low-value claims. 153 We explore several such rules
below. Although we focus primarily on a comparison of Delaware and
New York law, cases could be brought in many other jurisdictions,
giving rise to similar concerns.
a. Control over the Litigation
Perhaps the single most important goal for a plaintiffs' lawyer
in merger litigation is to be appointed lead counsel with the ability to
control the litigation. Most of the fees and reputational benefits
associated with the litigation go to the lawyers who control the
particular suit.154 Each jurisdiction applies its own rules for
determining which of several competing plaintiffs' teams will be
appointed lead plaintiff for a particular claim. Because plaintiffs'
attorneys value control, they prefer to file in jurisdictions where their
client is more likely to be appointed lead plaintiff. Moreover, because
plaintiffs may file merger suits in several jurisdictions, lawyers who
have not been appointed lead counsel in one jurisdiction may choose to
file in another jurisdiction in hopes of controlling the litigation there.
This tactic is possible because there is no means of consolidating
151. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1986).
152. See supra Part II.A.1 (defining "positioning rules" as those that affect the bargaining
power of plaintiffs' attorneys vis-A-vis other plaintiffs and their attorneys); see also Thomas &
Thompson, supra note 6, at 1757 (discussing this phenomenon as "fee distribution litigation").
153. On the ability of such positioning rules to motivate filing, see Cain & Davidoff, Great
Game, supra note 6, at 4-7 (arguing that differences in fee awards motivate cross jurisdictional
filings).
154. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S'holders Litig., Civil Action No. 5022-CC, 2011
WL 1135016, at *23-25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2011) (granting limited attorneys' fees to rival New
York attorneys but giving bulk of fees to Delaware counsel in Delaware settlement); Alaska Elec.
Pension, Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 417 (Del. 2009) (denying attorneys' fees in Delaware
settlement to rival plaintiffs' attorneys who had filed suit in California).
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merger litigation across jurisdictions. Leadership disputes are thus
likely to be an important factor driving the out-of-Delaware trend.
How jurisdictions allocate control over the litigation becomes a
critically important consideration.
Some jurisdictions may follow the traditional first-to-file rule
for awarding leadership roles.155 However, the law in most
jurisdictions leaves the appointment of lead counsel to the court's
discretion if counsel cannot agree.156 In New York, the state's class
action rule governs leadership disputes. The rule permits the
consideration of filing order, but "the principal factor . . . is whether
the appointment will serve the best interests of the shareholders."1 5 7
New York courts focus on the proposed lead counsel's credentials. 15 8
All things being equal among competing counsel, however, New York
courts have been willing to revert to the first-to-file rule.159
The tradition in Delaware was that plaintiffs' lawyers would
agree amongst themselves.160 Under Delaware custom, sometimes
described as a "race to the book," the out-of-state counsel who first
contacted prominent Delaware firms would control the litigation. 161 As
the Delaware bar expanded, however, newcomers were not happy with
this system and insisted on bringing leadership fights into court.162 In
2000, chancery addressed the issue, articulating the standards for the
155. See LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 4 (describing first-filed rule for selection of lead
counsel in some jurisdictions but without citation).
156. See, e.g., In re Zyprexia Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 128-30 (2d Cir. 2010)
(approving appointment of lead counsel in mass tort litigation); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,
557 F.2d 759, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming district court's authority to direct appointment of
committee of lead counsel).
157. Katz v. Clitter, 396 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); see also Rich v. Reisini, 266
N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) ("The guiding principle in the selection of counsel is to
find among those eligible the one who will best serve the interest of the plaintiffs.").
158. Rich, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
159. See, e.g., Sollins v. Alexander, No. 0060127/2006, 2006 WL 4682189 (N.Y. Gen. Term
Apr. 11, 2006).
160. ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1373.
161. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, plaintiffs' lawyers outside Delaware would all seek out
the same Delaware firm, who would rank these lawyers in their "black book" based on priority.
LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (conveying their firsthand knowledge of this practice as
partners in a prominent plaintiffs' side firm, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman LLP). This
system was based on a gentlemen's agreement where Delaware counsel would fairly apportion
control among outside counsel seeking out local representation. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d
927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993) (recognizing first-filed custom for appointment of lead or colead
counsel).
162. See, e.g., In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 18700-NC, 2001 WL 618210, at * 1
(Del. Ch. May 25, 2001) (lamenting the fact that "difficult and sometimes distasteful issues
involved with the designation of who . . . will direct and control the course of the action have
arisen with increased frequency").
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appointment of lead counsel when the lawyers cannot agree amongst
themselves. 163 The following standards now govern appointment of
lead counsel: (1) the quality of the pleadings; (2) which shareholder-
plaintiff has the biggest economic stake in the lawsuit; and (3) the
"energy, enthusiasm or vigor" with which the litigants have pursued
the litigation. 164 Taking pains to underscore that no one fact was
determinative and that, in particular, Delaware was not endorsing a
largest-shareholder rule akin to that of the PSLRA, the court
preserved a great deal of judicial discretion in deciding leadership
disputes.165
Subsequently, Delaware judges have gone to considerable
lengths to avoid using that discretion. While some opinions apply the
TCW Technologies factors (sometimes called the Hirt factors after a
later case), 166 other judges expressly refuse to pick a lead plaintiff.167
Courts' reluctance either to pick lead counsel or to articulate a
clear standard for plaintiffs to use in deciding leadership disputes on
their own can have two important effects on litigation. First, fighting
over who will serve as lead counsel delays proceedings. Lawyers
cannot begin to litigate the case until they have established who will
run the litigation. In the absence of a clear standard, such agreements
163. See TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18336, 18289, 18293, 2000
WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (listing factors "determining which lawsuit should
assume a lead or coordinating role").
164. Id.; see LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (referring to TCW as a landmark
decision"); ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1373 ("Only in 2000, however, did the Delaware
courts take concrete steps to displace the presumption that promptness would be rewarded as
and when disputes arose among plaintiffs' lawyers over the lead counsel role."); see also Hirt v.
U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., Nos. 19575, 19577-78, 19584, 19592, 19608, 19613, 19632, 2002 WL
1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002) (holding that the following factors should be considered on
a motion for lead counsel status: (1) the quality of the pleadings, (2) the relative economic states
of the competing litigants in the outcome of the lawsuit, (3) the willingness and ability of counsel
to litigate vigorously, (4) potential conflicts between larger and smaller stockholders, (5) vigor of
prosecution of the lawsuit thus far, and (6) counsel's competence and access to resources).
165. See TCW, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (adopting a liberal and discretionary factors-based
standard).
166. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec 31, 2010) (applying TCW factors in order to appoint lead counsel); Dutiel v.
Tween Brands, Inc., C.A. Nos. 4743-CC, 4845-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct 28,
2009) (same); Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A. 1116-N, Civ.A. 1117-N, Civ.A. 1119-N, Civ.A. 1125-
N, Civ.A. 1134-N, Civ.A. 1136-N, Civ.A. 1139-N., 2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar 22, 2005)
(same); Hirt, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (same).
167. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing
letter order to counsel from Chancellor Chandler dated, May 29, 2009, which read in part:
"Because I am unpersuaded by either motion, I will not grant any motion to ... appoint lead
counsel. I strongly urge you to make further attempts to resolve this dispute in a manner that
will enable the cases to be prosecuted efficiently.").
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will be difficult to reach. Second, enterprising lawyers might prefer to
litigate in jurisdictions where judges are more willing to appoint lead
counsel, especially if they believe they have a good chance of being so
appointed. Some commentators argue that Delaware's historic failure
either to decide or to articulate a clear standard for deciding
leadership disputes is likely one factor behind the out-of-Delaware
trend. 168
Contrast the Delaware approach with that of the federal
courts, where many of the out-of-Delaware cases are ultimately
decided. 169 Under the federal class action rule, courts must appoint
class counsel on the basis of factors similar to those suggested by the
Delaware courts. 170 In other words, the standards for appointment of
lead counsel are similar, but the enforcement approaches differ. The
federal courts do not hesitate to make appointments, occasionally
holding auctions for the role of lead counsel where appropriate.171
Lawyers who feel confident that they meet the criteria for
appointment, or that they can win an auction, may prefer the quick
and decisive determination of lead counsel that the federal courts
offer. This decisiveness could be a factor in explaining the growth of
multiforum deal litigation in federal court.172
b. Attorneys' Fees
Awarding attorneys' fees will also be controlled by the
procedural rules of the jurisdiction of the ultimate settlement. This is
168. See LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 ("A non-effective or dysfunctional process for
selecting lead counsel in class actions leads to suboptimal results for shareholders, waste for
defendants, and an inability for the court to move the case along, even as other jurisdictions
move ahead."); see also ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1372-76 (citing Delaware's
approach to appointing lead counsel as a cause to the out-of-Delaware trend).
169. ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1354-55 (finding a substantial growth of lawsuits
against companies incorporated in Delaware being filed in federal courts).
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A) lists the following factors:
(i) [T]he work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the
action; (ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and
the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable
law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.
171. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 80 n.192 (2001) (listing cases in
which courts ordered a lead counsel auction); see also Third Circuit Task Force Report on
Selection of Class Counsel, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (2001) (listing judicial class-counsel
auctions as a recent development that has "altered the class action landscape"). In securities
litigation, the lead plaintiff chooses lead counsel, an approach Delaware rejects. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3) (2006).
172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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another area over which judges exercise considerable discretion. In
Delaware, whether they are claiming to recover under a "common
fund" theory or a "corporate benefit" theory,173 plaintiffs' attorneys are
entitled to a fee award if: (1) the claim was meritorious when filed; (2)
there was an ascertainable class receiving the benefit; and (3) there
exists a causal relationship between the benefit and the lawsuit.174
Each of these requirements can be interpreted loosely or stringently to
award or deny fees. Accordingly, even if jurisdictions other than
Delaware considered fee awards a matter of substantive law, they
would still have significant discretion in the amounts to award. For
example, Delaware courts interpret the requirement that the suit be
meritorious when filed to mean that some of the claims would have
"some reasonable hope" of surviving a motion to dismiss. 75 This
requires considerable judicial speculation when litigation settles
before a motion to dismiss or motion for expedited proceedings is
decided. 176 The causation requirement requires similar speculation in
deciding, for example, whether corrective action taken by the
173. Under the "common fund" rule, the plaintiffs' attorney is awarded fees if he produced a
monetary benefit to the class, and his fees are paid from this collective pot. Under the "corporate
benefit" rule, the corporation pays the attorney's fees where the litigation has conferred a
nonmonetary benefit on the shareholders such as a change to the merger agreement or
additional disclosures. See In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S'holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353,
357 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("[T]he corporate benefit doctrine comes into play when a tangible monetary
benefit has not been conferred, but some other valuable benefit is realized by the corporate
enterprise or the stockholders as a group." (quoting In re Dunkin' Donuts S'holders Litig., No.
10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *1451 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1044-45 (Del. 1996) (describing
common benefit rule); Norman M. Monhait & P. Bradford deLeeuw, Negotiating and Litigating
Fee Awards in Delaware, 1740 PRACTISING L. INST. PROc. 561 (2009).
174. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. 1989) (enumerating these
factors in a significant benefit case); Dunkin' Donuts, 1990 WL 189120, at *1453 (enumerating
these factors in a common fund case).
175. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966) ("It is not necessary that
factually there be absolute assurance of ultimate success, but only that there be some reasonable
hope."); In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S'holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353, 362 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(holding that the complaint was meritorious because some claims survived a motion to dismiss).
176. In cases where the plaintiff actually survived a motion to dismiss or there were
expedited proceedings, this prong is easy to meet. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v.
Bradbury, C.A. No. 4446-VCN, 2010 WL 4273171, at *10 n.75 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (holding
that litigation was meritorious when filed because it proceeded to expedited proceedings);
Bancorp Consol., 756 A.2d at 362 (holding that litigation was meritorious when at least some
claims in fact survived motion to dismiss). But the Delaware courts have held this prong is met
even when plaintiffs have lost a summary judgment motion, because the rel4vant time frame for
determining merit is when the case was filed. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d
876, 879 (Del. 1980).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:4:1053
corporation prior to settlement was in fact caused by the litigation.177
Finally, Delaware courts must approve the ultimate amount of
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on the basis of a series of open-ended factors
that evaluate the amount of work and difficulty of the litigation. 78
Fees in New York are rumored to be higher than in Delaware,
yet the rules in the two states are functionally the same.179 In New
York, the class action rule governs attorneys' fees. It provides broad
judicial discretion "based on the reasonable value of legal services
rendered." 80 Similarly, New York plaintiffs must meet a causation
requirement, showing that the suit was the "proximate cause" of the
benefit obtained for the class.181 If there is a consistent New York
premium as some believe, it is the product of judicial discretion in fee
awards. The New York awards may be consistently higher because of
the higher cost of living and salaries in New York City, or because
when New York judges discuss these matters amongst themselves
they develop a collective sense of a higher "going rate" for certain
types of settlements than Delaware.182
177. Formally, the plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to a presumption that it may receive fees if
the corporation took action subsequent to the complaint that renders the litigation moot. In that
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that it took the action in question for some
reason other than the lawsuit. In practice, it seems that this shift only requires the defendant to
assert an alternative reason, and then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that
assertion. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension, Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 418 (Del. 2010) ("[T]o
overcome this presumption, the defendants must demonstrate that the lawsuit 'did not in any
way cause their action.' " (quoting Allied Artists, 413 A.2d at 880)). In that case, plaintiffs filed
lawsuits in California and Delaware, and the defendant settled with the Delaware plaintiffs. Id.
at 415. The Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, the plaintiffs who had filed in California, initially
objected to that settlement. Id. Thereafter, the acquirer increased its tender offer by nine dollars.
Id. Based on this increase, the Alaska plaintiffs' lawyers sought fees in the Delaware case, but
the court denied them. Id. at 416.
178. These are known as the "Sugarland Factors": (1) the benefit created/results achieved by
the litigation; (2) the difficulty of the litigation and time and efforts of counsel; (3) the contingent
nature of the undertaking; (4) the quality of the work performed; and (5) the standing and ability
of counsel. See Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980).
179. Like Delaware, New York courts permit attorneys' fees to be awarded where the
litigation provides a "substantial benefit" to the class even if that benefit is not monetary. In re
Cablevision Sys. Corp. S'holders Litig., 868 N.Y.S.2d 456, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) ("The benefit
need not have a 'readily ascertainable monetary value.' For example, where minority
shareholders successfully establish that a proxy solicitation for an upcoming merger is
materially misleading, they have conferred a substantial benefit on the corporation." (citations
omitted)).
180. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 909 (MCKINNEY 2011).
181. Cablevision Sys. Corp. S'holders Litig., 868 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
182. Deal litigation is litigated in the commercial part of the New York court system, where
judges are somewhat more specialized, so there is a possibility that they discuss awards with one
another. We do not have data on whether New York commercial part judges have the
cohesiveness that the Delaware Court of Chancery seems to have.
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The approval process that courts follow in determining fees
awarded to class counsel is, in an important sense, nonadversarial.
The defendant and shareholder class agree on the settlement prior to
the judicial determination and all parties to the settlement have a
strong interest in having the settlement and the concomitant fee
award approved by the court.'83 This process may become adversarial,
however, if the settlement or the fee award attracts objectors, as
described above.184
The discretion in fee awards allows judges to reward the types
of cases they seek to encourage and limit awards in the types of cases
they prefer not to see.185 Judicial attitudes towards fee awards are
likely to be determinative. 186 Commentators note the increasing
antiplaintiff rhetoric of the Delaware courts. 87 However, there are
counterexamples. In a recent case, Chancellor Strine awarded the
plaintiffs' firms a total of three hundred million dollars in attorneys'
fees.188 Strine took pains in the fee hearing to note that plaintiffs'
firms that take risks will be rewarded in Delaware courts.'89 Some
183. As one prominent judge noted, class counsel and defendants' counsel cannot be relied on
to point out unfair settlements; they are equally likely to "put one over on the court." Kamilewicz
v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc), quoted with approval in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct.
2231, 2249 (1997); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action
Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 88-90 (2004) (noting the nonadversarial nature of fairness
hearings and fee award determinations).
184. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text (describing the process for objecting to
a settlement or fee award).
185. See Alison Frankel, Record $285 Million Fee Award Is Strine's Message to the Plaintiffs'
Bar, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://newsandinsight.
thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/12_-_December/Record_$285
ml fee award isStrine_s.message-to-plaintiffs barl ("Monday's hearing on the Southern
Peru fee request made it clear that the chancellor wants a certain kind of (legal) business to
remain in Delaware. At the 90-minute hearing Strine talked about why this case isn't like the
M&A injunction suits that settle quickly for minimum benefit to shareholders."); accord Cain &
Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 4 (finding that state courts modify fee awards to attract
litigants).
186. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. 1989) ("In applying these
tests the Court of Chancery has broad discretion to deny fees to an individual plaintiff whose suit
would not have been meritorious had demand on the corporation been practical or effective.").
187. See ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1367-68 (discussing In re Cox
Communications Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005), and In re Revlon, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010)).
188. See Frankel, supra note 185 (noting that the award in the title was increased to three
hundred million dollars).
189. Id. ("If lawyers are willing to litigate big cases through discovery and trial, he
suggested, Delaware will make sure they're well compensated for their efforts.").
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speculated that this massive award was a reaction to suggestions of an
antiplaintiff bias among chancery judges.190
2. Buy-Side Opportunism
Defense lawyers, of course, are not perfect agents either. They
may fight unnecessarily in order to increase billable hours, filing
motions, and responses in all jurisdictions in which plaintiffs choose to
file. 191 The defense-side tactic that draws the most criticism in this
context is the reverse auction. 192 At the core, reverse auctions are
controversial because they are considered to be a form of collusion in
which defense attorneys and plaintiffs' attorneys work together to
undercompensate shareholder claimants. 193 This can be understood as
a defense-side agency cost on a theory that treats shareholders as the
essential corporate constituency. Under this theory, defense attorneys
serve as a kind of shareholder representative as opposed merely to
representing the interests of management. 194
Important structural mechanisms exist to tame the worst
consequences of the reverse auction. These are judicial review and
approval of settlement backstopped by the presence of objectors who
can prevent class interests from being sold out.195 In the context of
merger litigation, at least, the reverse auction is most problematic
when these structural mechanisms fail. 96 Unfortunately, there is
reason to believe that these mechanisms often do fail because would-
be objectors, to state the matter plainly, can be paid off. Defendants
have an incentive to see that competing counsel are paid off to
increase the certainty that the transaction will go forward.
As noted earlier, the benefit of settling merger litigation from
the defendants' perspective is the repose that permits the deal to go
forward. There is, however, a gap between the time that the parties
190. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, Great Game, supra note 6, at 2 ("The award was notable not
only because of the amount, but because it came only a few weeks after Chancellor Strine had
deliberately and publicly promoted the Delaware court as a friendly haven for plaintiffs'
attorneys to bring meritorious class action litigation.").
191. See Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 19 ("[Dlefense
lawyers benefit from this game, too. They get to bill hours without any meaningful reputational
risk from a loss."),
192. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
194. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
306-22 (1998) (describing the evolution of the norm of shareholder primacy in corporate law).
195. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
196. In other contexts, such as mass torts, the mechanism may be more broadly
objectionable. See supra note 148.
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are able to agree on settlement terms and judicial approval of
settlements. During this gap period, competing plaintiffs (objectors)
may seek to dismantle the settlement as defendants attempt to push
forward to close the transaction. As a result, defendants may make
"global peace"-the inclusion of competing plaintiffs in the ultimate
settlement-a condition to their settlement agreement. Whether
competing plaintiffs' counsel accepts or rejects offers to join in low
settlements thus becomes a crucial factor in determining whether a
reverse auction can in fact occur. 197
In spite of objectors' critical role in maintaining the integrity of
the settlement dynamics described above, courts and commentators
often view them with skepticism or downright contempt.198 This view
is driven by the practice of some attorneys who file objections in hopes
merely of being paid to withdraw them-a practice labeled objector
"extortion" or "blackmail."199 This practice is also said to be a part of
merger litigation. Some even suggest that many out-of-Delaware
filings are the work of passive "professional objectors" who have no
plans to actively litigate the case, but will insist on a share of the
attorneys' fees in exchange for withdrawing (or never filing) their
objections.200 For our purposes, the fact that objectors can be and often
are effectively paid off means objectors cannot be counted upon to
monitor and constrain the worst excesses of the reverse auction. 201
197. For example, in Nighthawk, described infra notes 203-05, the Delaware plaintiffs
appeared to be cooperating with the Arizona plaintiffs in settlement negotiations, to the dismay
of the chancery court.
198. See Brunet, supra note 142, at 411 (describing objectors as "the least popular litigation
participants in the history of civil procedure" and noting references to objectors as "warts on the
class action process," "pond scum," and "bottom feeders"). Courts have adopted a similarly
jaundiced view, occasionally sanctioning frivolous objections. See, e.g., Vollmer v. Publishers
Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 2001) (approving court-imposed fifty thousand
dollars in sanctions-to be donated to a charity-against objecting attorneys on the basis of
evidence that the objecting attorneys had no opportunity to dispute); In re: Wal-Mart Wage &
Hour Emp't Practices Litig., MDL No. 1735, No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 786513, at
*2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2010) (requiring objectors to post five hundred thousand dollar bond to
appeal the court's decision to reject their objections to the settlement); see also In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding one
hundred thousand dollars in sanctions against objecting counsel and reversing on due process
grounds a "scarlet letter" sanction requiring that objecting counsel attach documentation of the
sanctions proceeding to all future pro hac vice applications).
199. Brunet, supra note 142, at 426; Fitzpatrick, supra note 142, at 1624-25.
200. See, e.g., LEBOVITCH ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
201. The other side of the "blackmail" concern may be that objectors making meritorious
objections are not recognized by the court and receive little or no compensation for their work.
This discourages attorneys from objecting and encourages them to collude or to focus on
positioning themselves to lead the litigation against challengers rather than pressuring the
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Collusive settlement, in other words, may be a real and pervasive
threat in merger litigation, leading the market for preclusion to
systematically underprice shareholder claims.202
The Delaware chancery court recently addressed the issue of
collusive settlement in Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings,
Inc.203 Nighthawk involved competing lawsuits in Arizona and
Delaware. In the chancery court's preliminary review of the merits,
the merger raised potentially serious process issues but no colorable
disclosure claim. 204 The Delaware court refused to grant a motion to
expedite and criticized the plaintiffs for bringing a weak complaint,
apparently aimed at winning an easy disclosure-only settlement (and
associated attorneys' fees).2 05 Later, the court of chancery learned that
the case had settled on disclosure grounds in an Arizona court. 206
Because the litigants settled the suit on what the Vice Chancellor had
already found to be the weakest possible grounds,207 the Delaware
court decried the settlement as a "classic reverse auction."208 The Vice
Chancellor then appointed a special counsel to determine whether a
collusive settlement had in fact occurred and, if so, what the
defendant to offer a good settlement. See supra note 154 (citing cases involving potential
undercompensation of would-be objectors).
202. While we suspect, on the basis of these arguments, that the shareholder claims are
indeed systematically underpriced, there is currently no empirical data that we can point to in
order to prove this. Settlement values in merger litigation are certainly small. See supra notes
48-52 and accompanying text. However, this fact is as consistent with low-quality claims as it is
with systematic underpricing. Empirical data to support the claim of underpricing would be
extremely difficult to gather because it would require a qualitative evaluation of a set of claims-
that is, a subjective assessment based on a comprehensive review of case files--compared to their
quantitative settlement values. For an example of this kind of analysis in another context
(medical malpractice), see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68-87 (2007)
(collecting and analyzing the closed-claim file literature on medical malpractice claims and
settlements).
203. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 19-21 (expressing
skepticism toward defendants' use of reverse auctions).
204. The preliminary review of merits came in the context of a motion to expedite, which in
Delaware requires a "colorable claim" and the "threat of irreparable harm." Id. at 3.
205. See id. at 4 ("[M]y concern at that point was that the plaintiffs seemed only to be
litigating soft disclosure claims for the purpose of setting up a disclosure-based settlement.").
206. See id. ("[Ilmagine my surprise when ... I got a letter informing me that the parties had
agreed to a disclosure-based settlement [in Arizona].").
207. See id. ("[T]he settlement consideration was the claims that I already said weren't
colorable. There was no apparent effort to address the claims that I thought were colorable. And
rather than coming back to me on this, the parties had decided to go to the Arizona state
courts.").
208. Id. at 11; see also id. at 17 ("What happened here is the plaintiffs filed a case that really
had legs. And I told you guys you had legs-it had legs. And what do you know. All of a sudden
[defense attorneys] are both working over the plaintiffs to get them to Arizona. That's a
problem.").
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consequences should be, including potential revocation of the litigants'
pro hac vice status.209
Defining the issue as whether the parties reached a low-value
settlement as a result of an implicit or explicit agreement to buy off a
particular plaintiffs' attorney,210 the special counsel concluded that a
reverse auction had not taken place. However, several traditional
factors indicating collusion were indeed present.211 The special
counsel's reasoning ultimately emphasized the absence of hard
evidence of collusion,212 along with the fact that the Nighthawk
settlement was comparable to other settlements in terms of speed,
attorneys' fees, and discovery. 213
Although the special counsel's report and the court's
subsequent approval of the Arizona settlement were ultimately
nonevents, Nighthawk represents a clear warning to counsel seeking
to engage in collusive-settlement practices.214 While we agree that
209. Id. at 27-28.
210. Brief of Special Counsel at 26, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No.
5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011). The special counsel summarized the issue as follows:
[A] collusive settlement in the context of stockholder deal litigation appears to involve,
at its core, an explicit or implicit agreement between counsel for plaintiffs and counsel
for defendants to require less consideration for the settling class in exchange for (1)
exclusive dealings with particular plaintiffs' counsel and/or (2) more consideration for
plaintiffs' counsel. Factors that should give rise to heightened scrutiny for
collusiveness include the following: settlement consideration disproportionately weak
in comparison to the strength of the claims asserted; settlement with a plaintiffs firm
that typically does not litigate aggressively when other, more formidable, firms are
involved in the litigation; and an agreement to pay attorneys' fees significantly higher
than are typical given the settlement consideration.
Id. at 26-27.
211. Id. Factors present included: document discovery provided only for purposes of
settlement, preferential negotiations with one set of plaintiffs' attorneys, exclusion of the
Delaware plaintiffs from the negotiation, and the avowed willingness of the Arizona plaintiffs to
settle for disclosures on a claim that had already been discredited in Delaware court, giving the
Delaware plaintiffs the "ultimatum to get on board or lose out." Id. at 27.
212. Id. at 28 (citing the fact that there were more claims filed in Arizona than Delaware and
that it is typically easier to induce minority plaintiffs to join a settlement with the majority than
vice versa).
213. See id. at 28-29 ("With the exception of the parties' move to settle away from a
jurisdiction that had made merits rulings, review of the parties' negotiations revealed a fairly
typical arm's-length negotiation. . . . Nothing in the negotiations themselves were outside the
bounds of similar negotiations in similar cases.").
214. See Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 22:
[M]any defense counsel historically seem to have regarded this reverse-auction
dynamic as something wonderful . .. for the benefit of their clients. But as I tried to
remind people in the Revlon case, you're dealing with fiduciaries for a class. And when
you knowingly induce a fiduciary breach, you're an aider and abettor.
Moreover, Nighthawk is not the only Delaware decision critical of collusive-settlement practices.
See, e.g., Stepak v. Tracinda Corp., C.A. No. 8457, 1989 WL 100884, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21,
1989) ("Where there are two or more attorneys purporting to act on behalf of the same or
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collusive settlement is a significant problem where it occurs, we
disagree with the chancery court's approach in Nighthawk.
Threatening to sanction defense counsel for engaging in collusive-
settlement practices seems likely to overdeter since it is so difficult to
distinguish an impermissible reverse auction from a valid exercise of
the defendant's monopsony power. Moreover, a simple prohibition
threatens to destroy the benefits associated with the reverse auction
mechanism made possible by the filing of multiple suits, throwing the
proverbial baby out with the bathwater. We therefore offer, in Part III
below, a more nuanced response to the imperfections of the market for
preclusion.
C. Positive Externalities of the Market for Preclusion: The Strategic
Outsourcing of Corporate Law
Before proceeding to our policy discussion of how best to correct
imperfections in the market for preclusion, it is worth pausing to
consider the interests of a party that we have so far left out of our
account: the state of Delaware. Even if the market for preclusion
creates benefits for litigants in many cases, the flight of corporate law
cases to other jurisdictions would nevertheless seem to present a
dangerous situation to Delaware. The flight may result in a loss of
expertise in its judiciary, a loss of revenues from incorporations, and
the adulteration of the core Delaware product. 215
Notwithstanding this parade of horribles, the market for
preclusion offers substantial benefits to Delaware. Not only does the
out-of-Delaware trend pose no serious threat to Delaware's dominant
position in the corporate-chartering business, it also creates an
opportunity to engage in a process we call strategic outsourcing-that
is, an opportunity to keep good cases while letting bad ones go.
Strategic outsourcing allows Delaware to reduce administrative costs
and conserve judicial resources for deployment in those cases most
likely to chart the future path of corporate law. It also permits
Delaware to avoid cases that entail potential political risk to
Delaware's position as the leading state of incorporation.
overlapping classes, there is a special risk that a defendant will seek advantage in choosing the
adversary with whom it will negotiate . . . ."); In re MCA, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 11740,
1993 WL 43024, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 1993) ("The potential for this type of abuse clearly exists
in representative litigation.").
215. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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1. The Market for Preclusion and the Market for Corporate Charters
Delaware's position as the dominant jurisdiction of
incorporation for American businesses, especially large businesses,
creates enormous value for the state.216 Thus, whatever its other
advantages, if the market for preclusion threatened Delaware's
dominance in the market for corporate charters, Delaware would have
a good reason to take strong actions against it. But the market for
preclusion does not threaten Delaware's near monopoly over the
incorporation business. We consider first the effect of the market for
preclusion on Delaware's competition with other states, and then with
respect to the federal government.
In order for another state to challenge Delaware's dominance
as a state of incorporation, it would need to offer a corporate law
product that appealed to at least one of Delaware's two principal
interest groups: managers or shareholders. No state has successfully
mounted a serious challenge to Delaware, though some have tried.217
In any event, the way forward for any state seeking to challenge
Delaware law lies in the creation of that state's own law. By merely
reinterpreting Delaware law (the most a state would be able to do
with the occasional Delaware suit that landed in its courts) rival
states cannot capture its advantages. The corporations they benefit
are, after all, incorporated elsewhere. Should a rival state's court issue
an opinion in such a case-itself a rarity2 18-it can only improve
Delaware law since the desirable innovation immediately becomes
part of Delaware law, while misapplications or misinterpretations can
be swiftly disavowed. 219 Improving a rival's product is not an effective
216. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210-11 (2001) (noting the enormous tax revenues Delaware
receives as a result of its dominance in the market for incorporations).
217. Nevada has emerged as the most clear corporate law alternative to Delaware. See
generally Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free
Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012). Nevada clearly designed it this way. See id. at 953-55
(citing legislative history to show that a primary reason behind a 2001 amendment to free
corporate officers and directors from liability was to make Nevada more competitive with
Delaware with respect to the market for incorporations). In the legislature, for example, one
state representative argued that "Nevada ought to offer some liability protection to directors of
corporations" to accommodate incorporation fee increases and to generate more incorporation
revenues. See id. at 953.
218. Non-Delaware courts deciding cases under Delaware law rarely issue opinions. See
ABC, Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 617-18.
219. Legal improvement here has the character of a public good: the non-Delaware court has
no real incentive to attempt it since all (or most) of the benefit of the improvement will be
captured by Delaware. Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 358
(1974).
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means of competition. The market for preclusion thus creates no real
competitive opportunities for rival states.
Even if it is not the substance of Delaware corporate law but
rather the expertise of its judiciary that explains that state's
dominance in the corporate-chartering business, the market for
preclusion still poses no threat to Delaware. No other state court is
likely to develop a reputation of corporate law expertise equal to
Delaware's merely as a result of hearing the occasional Delaware case.
Nor will other states derive significant advantage by "scooping"
Delaware and becoming the first to decide a novel issue of corporate
law. The business community understands that the issue is not really
decided until Delaware speaks. 220
Individual judges in rival states may occasionally try to impose
an idiosyncratic view of corporate law on the Delaware cases that
come before them. However, such decisions are not likely to have any
lasting effect in Delaware since they can be easily disavowed.
Moreover, any systematic promanagement or proshareholder biases of
a rival state's courts are likely to be self-correcting through the
political clout of instate managers pushing back when courts tilt too
far in favor of shareholderS221 or by the plaintiffs' bar ceasing to bring
cases before courts that tilt too far in favor of management. 222 Thus,
the principal incentive of a rival state's judiciary will likely be to
decide whatever Delaware cases appear in his or her courtroom
efficiently and correctly. The rival state's judiciary should waste as
little time and effort as possible, considering his or her own crowded
220. See, e.g., Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007):
[This Court noted, as it has in the past, that "novel and substantial issues of
Delaware corporate law are best resolved in Delaware courts." Thus, while the
application of Delaware law in most cases is not determinative, more weight must be
accorded to this factor where the law is novel. Such is the case here.
As we explore below, Delaware judges do have an informal system by which they can win control
over significant cases. See infra Part II.C.2.
221. Any non-Delaware court hearing a Delaware case is likely to be located in the state of
the principal place of business of the defendant corporation. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text (describing where cases may be filed). Thus, a judge that sought to reach a radical
proshareholder outcome would harm a strong instate interest group (i.e., the defendant
corporation) with no concomitant instate benefit as public shareholders are likely to be diffused
throughout the country and the world. State judges, whether elected or appointed, are unlikely
to cultivate reputations for hostility to prominent instate businesses.
222. See supra Part I.B (describing that it is plaintiffs who decide where to file initially). For
an empirical study of the same phenomenon in a different context, see Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179
(2007).
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docket. 223 The only real threat to Delaware, therefore, is the risk of
innocent error in applying its law. Even this is likely to be rare since
merger cases routinely settle. The role of the rival state courts in the
market for preclusion is often to approve settlements. 224
Likewise, Delaware has little to fear when its cases are brought
in federal court, as many recently have been. 225 Although it may be
true that the principal threat to Delaware is the federal government,
not rival states,226 the federal government exercises its power by
preempting Delaware law through legislation and rulemaking. 227
There is little threat in a federal judge hearing the occasional
Delaware case. Moreover, in the absence of federal incorporation,228
federal judges have even less incentive than rival state judges to
encourage merger litigation in their jurisdiction. 229 The market for
preclusion, in sum, presents little threat to Delaware's dominance in
the corporate-chartering business. Rather, as we describe in the next
Section, it provides several opportunities for the state.
223. This same dynamic suggests that in cases where Delaware seeks to retain control over a
case pending in a parallel jurisdiction, the other judge's incentive is to cede control to Delaware
in order to get the case off of his or her docket. However, we have also heard that sometimes
judges in competing jurisdictions seek to control cases because of pride, the size of the case, or
the import of the corporation in question to the local economy. Building an interjurisdictional
dialogue, described below, may go some way toward rationalizing this decision. See infra Part III.
224. See, e.g., Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 5 (disapproving
of the decision of the parties to seek approval of a settlement in an Arizona court that was
unfamiliar with the issues of Delaware law and the case at hand). It is possible, however, that a
rival court will schedule or even hear a preliminary injunction motion where the lawyers litigate
the case vigorously. See, e.g., In re The Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 63 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(noting that a New York court scheduled a preliminary injunction motion). In meritorious cases,
this is a benefit to shareholders because it will either prevent a poor merger or result in greater
compensation.
225. See supra note 70 (describing increase in opinions from Federal courts).
226. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 4, at 601 ("Delaware ... gets to make, or keep, only the rules
that the federal authorities do not make themselves. What is left for Delaware is only what is left
after the federal authorities act."); see also Renee Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the
Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004) (describing how federal regulatory
intervention has threatened Delaware's primacy in corporate governance).
227. Roe, supra note 4, at 600.
228. This is so because there is currently no system of federal incorporation available as an
alternative to Delaware and, at present, no serious prospect for one. See id. at 602. This was not
always so. See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 700-03 (1974) (proposing federal corporate uniformity standards to mitigate the
"race to the bottom" among states).
229. The federal caseload alone seems to compel this conclusion. In 2011, for example, there
were 55,763 and 294,336 cases filed in the U.S. courts of appeals and U.S. district courts,
respectively. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD INDICATORS: 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH
31 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics
/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/front/IndicatorsMarll.pdf.
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2. Strategic Outsourcing
The basic outcome of the current regime is that Delaware
courts do not hear every dispute involving Delaware corporations.
This outcome offers a clear upside to the state-namely, the
conservation of judicial resources and administrative costs. Yet, if the
state really has no control over which cases it hears, then the value of
such savings is suspect. Delaware could lose as many good cases as
bad ones-worse, it could lose more good cases than bad ones.
However, there is a system based on formal procedural rules and
informal judicial communications by which Delaware can often retain
control over many of the cases it prefers to decide. Even if the system
is not perfect-which it is not-the fact that it functions much of the
time suggests that a significant selection effect is present. Delaware
can hear cases of first impression or cases that are otherwise likely to
make a contribution to the body of accreted precedent. It can avoid
bad cases such as those that are weak, dull, low value, or otherwise
unworthy of the investment of judicial resources. Importantly,
Delaware can use this ability to cherry-pick cases to avoid cases that
may prove politically damaging.
Delaware can deploy several of the procedural rules described
in Part II to keep desirable cases in its own courts. For example,
Delaware can apply forum non conveniens analysis to retain control
over a case in spite of its having been filed in another jurisdiction
first.230 Moreover, Delaware can expedite cases it would like to keep to
increase the likelihood that another jurisdiction deciding whether to
stay or proceed with a related claim will defer to the more advanced
process in Delaware. 231 On the other side, Delaware courts can refuse
to exercise this discretion for cases they are not especially eager to
keep.
As important as the strategic use of formal procedural rules,
but less remarked upon, is the informal system of communications
230. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining that Delaware has treated cases
filed up to seven days apart as "simultaneously filed" and rejected the first-filed rule altogether
in representative litigation in order to permit it to apply its forum non conveniens analysis to
determine control over the lawsuit).
231. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of York Emp. Ret. Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., C.A. No. 4066-
VCN, 2008 WL 4824053, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2008) (granting plaintiffs' request for expedited
discovery). There the Delaware chancery court refused to stay a lawsuit challenging the merger
of Merrill Lynch and Bank of America, even though a related federal action had been pending for
eleven months. Id. at *1-5. The Delaware court further granted the plaintiffs' request for
expedited discovery. Id. at *8 (after discussing the weaknesses of the various claims, the court
stated that it "finds a sufficiently pled possibility of irreparable harm here to justify expediting
the claims").
[Vol. 66:4:10531102
2013] THE MARKET FOR PRECLUSION 1103
between judges across state lines regarding the control of a particular
case.232 Delaware judges frequently contact out-of-state judges in cases
of known simultaneous litigation in order to avoid duplicative and
inconsistent rulings. 233 For example, in Nighthawk, Vice Chancellor
Laster sent a copy of the transcript of the hearing where he excoriated
counsel for engaging in a reverse auction to the Arizona judge before
whom the offending settlement was pending. 234 Likewise, in Allion,
Chancellor Chandler encouraged parties to file motions requesting
that judges in parallel jurisdictions confer with one another. 235 Similar
informal communications between state and federal judges occur in
mass tort cases. 236 There is, as yet, no formal mechanism to trigger
this type of communication across jurisdictional boundaries; we
propose one in Part III, below. Such consultations may not always be
effective. 237 Nevertheless, informal communications constitute another
tool in the hand of a judiciary seeking to retain control over a case.
232. Further research remains to be done on these networks of informal communications.
233. Evan 0. Williford, Chancery Rules on Revlon Standard for Mixed Case/Stock Deals,
DEL. CORP. L. UPDATE (May 31, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://evanwilliford.wordpress.com/
category/preliminary-injunction.
234. See In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016,
at *4 n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011):
[M]y preference would be for defendants to "go into all the Courts in which the
matters are pending . .. asking those judges to please confer and agree upon .. . what
jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions are going to
stand down and allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter."
Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 25 ("Now-but to ensure that the
Arizona Court is informed, I will enter an order directing the Register in Chancery to provide a
copy of this transcript and other materials from this case to the Court."); see also Micheletti &
Parker, supra note 6, at 38 n.177 (citing these cases for the same proposition).
235. See In re Allion Healthcare, at 4 n.12:
[J]udges in different jurisdictions might not always find common ground on how to
move the litigation forward. Nevertheless, this would be, I think, one (if not the most)
efficient and pragmatic method to deal with this increasing problem. It is a method
that has worked for me in every instance when it was tried.
236. The Federal Judicial Center recommends such communications. FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.14 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing communication between
courts where related cases are filed in different jurisdictions and the importance of effective
communication); id. § 20.31 (describing informal communication methods); id. § 21.15 (discussing
coordination in the context of parallel class actions).
237. Informal communications, for example, may not be as effective in leading to a stay of
one action when the competing jurisdiction is a federal court as opposed to another state court.
Federal courts will proceed with parallel litigation unless there are "exceptional circumstances."
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. Delaware courts seeking to retain jurisdiction are
generally unlikely to benefit from the "exceptional circumstances" contemplated by federal law,
and will therefore have to use formal procedures, such as expediting discovery, to retain control
of a case filed concurrently in federal court.
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The combination of formal and informal systems to allocate
control provides Delaware with considerable discretion over which
cases it will decide and which cases it will allow to go to another
jurisdiction. This sorting mechanism is not perfect-Topps, after all,
did happen. 238 The availability of various tools at Delaware's disposal,
however, suggests that the cases that are staying in Delaware are not
selected solely by plaintiffs' counsel, but also by chancery itself. This
means Delaware likely already hears more good cases than bad ones.
A good case, in this context, may be one that allows Delaware
to clarify aspects of corporate law or one that allows Delaware to
develop corporate law doctrine to respond to contemporary events.
Between 2003 and 2006, for example, Delaware announced several
important decisions that honed the doctrinal meaning of "good faith"
as a tool to increase corporate accountability. These decisions
responded to a political climate (in the aftermath of the Enron and
WorldCom debacles) that threatened Delaware's primacy as a
corporate lawmaker. 239 Developing this jurisprudence consumed
significant judicial resources, including a televised multiday trial in
Delaware chancery court. It is obviously easier for Delaware to muster
judicial resources for such "statement" cases if it has a pressure-relief
valve, releasing it from the necessity of hearing every case filed under
Delaware law. This is especially true if a lawsuit accompanies every
merger. The market for preclusion provides Delaware with just such
an opportunity.
Strategic outsourcing is useful in another political sense.
Delaware may take advantage of parallel litigation to avoid hearing
cases that risk stirring a backlash against Delaware and thus
jeopardize its dominant position as a corporate lawmaker. The case in
point is the merger between Bear Stearns and J.P. Morgan Chase,
brokered by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department in the
midst of the 2008 financial crisis. 240 The ultimate merger agreement
238. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Serv., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A.
No. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *9 nn.36-37 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) (conceptualizing good
faith analyses as belonging under both the duties of loyalty and care); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003) (establishing good faith as a claim that is
independent of the duties of care or loyalty, but which is tied to those two traditional fiduciary
duties). See generally Griffith, supra note 4, at 16, 44-52 (arguing that the Delaware judiciary
developed the good faith doctrine in response to the corporate scandals that started in the early
2000s).
240. In re Bear Stearns, C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *1-3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9,
2008). For a detailed discussion of this deal and Delaware's political dilemma in taking the case,
1104 [Vol. 66:4:1053
THE MARKET FOR PRECLUSION
included harsh deal-protection provisions that likely would have given
the shareholder plaintiffs grounds for injunctive relief.241 Rather than
enjoining a transaction that the federal government deemed necessary
to prevent the collapse of the U.S. financial system, the Delaware
chancery court took notice of a parallel proceeding in New York state
court and stayed proceedings in Delaware. 242 The unstated but
unmistakable rationale of the court was that New York could be
responsible for bringing down the financial system if it liked,243 but
Delaware would not presume to do so. Thanks to the pendency of the
New York action, Delaware did not need to distort its precedent in
order to bring about the necessary result.244 Clearly such threats to
Delaware's primacy as a corporate lawmaker are rare, but as the Bear
Stearns example shows, they do come up. The market for preclusion
provides Delaware with an important pressure-relief valve for
avoiding such situations.
What all of this suggests to us is that the market for preclusion
may provide important benefits to its participants. It allows Delaware
courts to avoid both low-value and politically costly cases while still
making law in statement cases. Shareholders meanwhile benefit from
the improved outcomes they receive through their attorneys' use of
pressuring rules and, equally, through the ability of defendants to
bring low value claims to a quick conclusion via the market
mechanism. While these mechanisms may be subject to abuse, a
problem we have acknowledged and will address in the next Part, the
benefits inherent in the market for preclusion suggest that
multijurisdictional litigation is not the source of deadweight loss that
see Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 716-21, 744-59; Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition,
Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 127-30 (2009).
241. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 719-20, 743-44 (describing the Share Exchange
Agreement and analyzing its preclusive effect).
242. Id. at 720-21.
243. Fortunately for New York and perhaps all Americans, the shareholders withdrew their
objection to the merger before the New York court needed to decide the issue. Id. at 721.
244. In the words of Professors Kahan and Rock:
By taking advantage of the pendency of actions in New York and the defendants'
motion to stay, and by invoking the doctrine of comity to allow a New York trial court
judge to decide a pure question of Delaware corporate law, Delaware managed to
dodge both bullets. On the one hand, it could predict that the New York judge would
not enjoin the transaction for a similar set of reasons that would lead Delaware to
refrain from enjoining such a deal. On the other hand, any decision approving the
merger would have no precedential value in Delaware and thus would not disturb its
case law. And if the New York court were to distort the facts to reach such a decision,
it would matter even less for Delaware.
Id. at 756 (citation omitted).
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others have suggested.245 The next Part discusses how to regulate the
market for preclusion to correct its anticipated defects.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING COMITY
Ultimately, multijurisdictional merger litigation is a product of
federalism. Comity requires that states respect other states' laws. This
principle, combined with corporate law's internal affairs doctrine,
allows Delaware to export its corporate law throughout the United
States.246 States are understandably reluctant to cede all authority
over what they consider to be instate businesses merely because the
organizational documents are filed elsewhere. For example, Wal-Mart
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Bentonville, Arkansas. 247 Wal-Mart is famously centralized,
negotiating all contracts in Bentonville and controlling even the
number of items on the shelves in every store across the United States
from Bentonville. 248 It is not hard to see why Arkansas might believe
that it has as much right to adjudicate the fate of Wal-Mart as
Delaware ven if it is not the state of incorporation and even if it has
to apply Delaware law to reach its decision.
Federalism means not only that the national government is
asked to respect Delaware's sovereignty but also that Delaware and
every other state is asked to respect the sovereignty of sister states
operating within legitimate spheres of control. The situation described
in this Article presents an overlap of these spheres of control, creating
a tension between sister states. Any solution to this problem must
account for these important horizontal federalism concerns.
Since the ratification of the Constitution, no robust theory has
developed to explain how the states ought to get along in spheres in
which the federal government does not intervene. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause gives little insight into the horizontal relationship
245. See Strine, Hamermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 54, at 25-26 (asserting that
multiforum litigation leads to deadweight loss). The difference in our positions may be due, in
part, to our starting point on the value of merger litigation generally. See supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
246. Under the internal affairs doctrine, states apply the substantive law of the state of
incorporation notwithstanding the location of headquarters or other contacts that the corporation
may have with the state. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 621 (1983).
247. Frequently Asked Questions: Operations, WALMART.COM, http://investors.walmartstores.
com/phoenix.zhtml?c=1 12761&p-irol-faq (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
248. CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
COMPANY REALLY WORKS AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2006).
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between states.249 The scholarly literature is not helpful because for
the most part it focuses on the relationship between the states and the
federal government.250 Hence, the prevailing theory of comity can be
concisely summarized as follows: in those areas where there is no
federal intervention, states exercise power within their territories and
lack power outside their territories. 251 To date, the formal relationship
between state courts has been limited to the decision to stay a case or
to decline jurisdiction. 252 The limits of both the theory and the practice
of comity are most evident when this process fails and lawsuits over
the same subject matter proceed simultaneously in two jurisdictions.
249. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyers' Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1945) (describing the limitations of the courts' interpretation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and arguing in favor of greater integration of our legal systems).
The federal courts can rarely decline jurisdiction. See discussion of the Colorado River doctrine,
supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
250. This is not to say that there has not been a great deal of thoughtful recent scholarship
focusing on various aspects of federalism. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 28 (focusing on the
interaction between federal, state, and local actors, coining the term "polyphonic federalism" to
describe the variety of interactions); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination
Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 584-92 (2010) (explaining the
importance of coordination between government and private actors); David Engdahl, The Classic
Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1586-94 (2009) (arguing that Full Faith and
Credit Clause was intended as an evidentiary rule, not as a self-executing provision, and that the
focus should be on the effects clause); Heather K. Gerken & Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009) (illustrating how states can both
be harnessed by the federal government to realize national policy goals and how states can resist
the attempts by the federal government to realize these goals); Abbe Gluck, Intersystematic
Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 'Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1960-
68 (2011) (emphasizing the role of states as interpreters of federal law by focusing on the
different methodologies state courts employ when interpreting federal statutes); Gillian E.
Metzger, Congress, Article IV and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1493-98 (2007)
(focusing on the relationship between the federal government and state courts as regulated by
both the Full Faith and Credit and Effects Clauses); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 626-28, 630-34, 642-44 (2001)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's inaccurate description of the relationship between federal, state,
and local governments); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1201 (2009) (describing history of attempts to legislate the effects of sister-state judgments
in the early Congress and ultimate failure to do so).
251. This theory is at least as old as the Supreme Court's opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff, that
famous personal jurisdiction case most students are assigned in their first year of law school. 95
U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (explaining that two principles of public law apply to the relationship
between the states: "One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . . The other principle of public
law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.").
252. See Jackson, supra note 249, at 31 (discussing state power to dismiss actions under the
doctrine); supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing standards for stay or dismissal under
forum non conveniens doctrine).
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Principles of comity are not sufficiently well developed to address this
type of problem. 253
But of course the territorial theory of comity is not an accurate
description of the relationship between the states. The fact that
Delaware succeeded in exporting its corporate law to every state in the
country demonstrates that the relationship between the states is one
of overlapping spheres rather than separate territories. Accordingly, a
more substantial conception of comity than the traditional framework
of territoriality and vertical control is needed. Since a state court
cannot usurp the power to enjoin parallel actions outside its
jurisdiction, and centralization is undesirable, the most efficient
solution is likely to be found through negotiation.
Our approach contrasts with the recommendations of other
commentators who advocate solving these problems with greater
centralization and control. These commentators typically give short
shrift to the competing interests of sister states and the potential
benefits of overlapping jurisdiction. In the sections that follow, we first
critique centralization. Then we sketch a more robust conception of
horizontal comity that we think responds appropriately to the defects
in the market for preclusion.
A. Against Centralization
All class actions founded on state law once raised the
multijurisdictional litigation issues now facing merger litigation.254
With the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), however,
class actions were effectively federalized, allowing all suits to be
consolidated in a single federal court.255 Multijurisdictional litigation
persists in the merger context only because corporate law class actions
253. See generally Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (noting, in a case
concerning overlapping class actions, that "our legal system generally relies on principles of stare
decisis and comity among courts to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litigation
brought by different plaintiffs").
254. See, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 540-42
(1996) (discussing the challenges of duplication and overlaps); Nagareda, supra note 17, at 159
(discussing the "market for preclusive effect"); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80
B.U. L. REV. 461, 512-19 (2000) (discussing various areas of the law in which parallel class
actions were brought predating CAFA).
255. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. CAFA was widely seen as
a boon to corporate defendants because it effectively killed the national consumer class action,
making it significantly more difficult for consumers to vindicate their rights collectively. See
generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038985 (describing the difficulties plaintiffs faced
in organizing a class action under CAFA).
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were explicitly carved out of CAFA in order to preserve Delaware as a
forum for corporate disputes.256 Now many of the core policy
arguments that were originally sounded in favor of CAFA-arguments
focusing on the costs of forum shopping and the proliferation of
duplicative nonmeritorious suitS2 57-are being made in the context of
merger litigation. 258 It is therefore unsurprising to find that a similar
approach-consolidation and centralization-dominates contemporary
policy discussions of multijurisdictional merger litigation.
There are at least three approaches to centralization in the
context of merger litigation. The first is to mandate exclusive federal
jurisdiction over merger litigation. 259 A second approach imposes
exclusive jurisdiction for merger litigation in the state of
incorporation. 260 A third, similar to the second, would establish
centralization as an opt-in strategy rather than a legal mandate by
encouraging the adoption of forum-selection provisions in corporate
charters or bylaws. 261 In our view, each of these approaches upsets the
balance of federalism unnecessarily, destroying the potential benefits
of the market for preclusion.
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2) (2006) (excepting removal from class actions that solely
involve "internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other form of business enterprise and
arises under or by virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation or business
enterprise is incorporated or organized"). There were also exceptions for securities class actions,
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1), presumably because the PSLRA & Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") already address jurisdictional issues in that area. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (addressing private securities class actions); Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (discussing removal of
covered class actions).
257. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1164-65 (2012) (discussing CAFA's legislative
history); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2039 & n.9 (2008) (describing CAFA's stated
purpose and analyzing the "jurisdictional paradox" it embodies). For arguments raising similar
concerns and predating CAFA, see Miller, supra note 254, at 516 (arguing that overlapping class
actions burden the efficient enforcement of the law).
258. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
259. The multidistrict litigation statute allows related federal suits to be transferred to one
forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
260. See, e.g., ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1395-96 (citing a federal proposal to limit
multidistrict litigation to the state of incorporation).
261. Proponents of this approach include Stanford law professor and former SEC
Commissioner Joseph Grundfest and prominent defense-side litigator Ted Mirvis. Joseph
Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective
Approaches 15-16, 24 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No.
91, Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1690561;
Anywhere But Chancery, supra note 64, at 17.
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1. Forced Federalization
In general, the federalization of class actions has been part of a
strategy to tame (or kill) the beast of litigation.262 It is not clear,
however, that the federalization of merger class actions would have
the effect of taming or killing them. CAFA dealt a serious blow to
national consumer class actions. The reason for this is the difficulty of
the choice-of-law inquiry in national suits. Consumer protection laws
differ from state to state, although the product or service may be
uniform. As a result, federal courts have held that individual choice-
of-law issues predominate over collective issues, so that national
classes cannot be certified.263 Merger litigation does not present this
hurdle to certification since all claims, wherever the shareholders or
the corporation may in fact reside, arise under Delaware law.
Plaintiffs might benefit from the federalization of merger
litigation since many of the pressuring rules discussed above are
available in federal court.264 The federal system does not approach
these procedural issues in a uniform manner. This creates the
potential that plaintiffs will file strategically in the federal district
they think most beneficial to them. Competing lawsuits will
262. See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 595, 595 (1997):
Defendants have historically used federal class actions to resolve their litigation
problems in the context of securities, financial, commercial, employment, and other
types of cases. They have long been successful in obtaining finality, predictability, and
a cessation of financial and public relations bleeding by agreeing to class action
settlements to disputes.
See also Klonoff, supra note 255, at 1-7 (discussing genesis of CAFA as an attempt to limit use of
the class action device); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1852-55 (2008)
(discussing how Congress passed CAFA in an effort to address abuses in class action lawsuits).
263. At least under current interpretations of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class
Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1857 (2006) (describing barriers to certifying class
actions invoking laws of multiple states). But see Sullivan v. DB Inv., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 301-05
(3d Cir. 2011) (approving settlement despite some variations in state laws and noting that the
class action could not be certified for litigation).
264. For example, federal courts may make expedited discovery available more readily than
Delaware courts. Federal courts may make more information available to plaintiffs by limiting
the business strategy immunity. Some federal judges may schedule preliminary injunction
hearings more readily than their Delaware counterpars. A jury trial may be available in federal
court where it would not be an option in Delaware chancery court. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (holding that the Erie doctrine does not mandate that state
law limiting access to jury be applied in federal court because the jury right is an "essential
factor in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides"); see also supra note 119
(addressing applicability of Seventh Amendment to merger litigation).
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eventually be consolidated into a single federal court. 265 However, it
will not always be the same federal district, nor can the defendant be
guaranteed that the federal court that ultimately hears the case will
be the one that best suits its interests. 266
It is important to recall, as well, that the technical barrier to
federalizing merger litigation is the express exception to CAFA
excluding suits relating to the internal affairs or governance of a
corporation.267 This exception exists to protect the interests of
Delaware more than it does the interests of plaintiffs or defendants. 268
Federalization hurts Delaware by realizing the state's persistent fears
that it will lose control over the corporate law product and no longer
be able to extract value from its leading position in the market for
corporate charters. 269 Moreover, insofar as the coherence of Delaware
corporate law administered by an expert judiciary provides value to
corporations and their shareholders, federalization threatens to harm
them, as well, without providing a clear countervailing benefit. 270
2. Delaware Repatriation
A second proposal for resolving the problem of multiforum
merger litigation is to require that all litigation concerning the
internal affairs of a Delaware corporation be brought in Delaware.271
Setting aside the practical difficulties of passing such legislation, 272
does centralizing merger litigation in Delaware produce a better
outcome for either the various stakeholders or society?
A Delaware-only solution offers several benefits. It would save
resources across jurisdictions by avoiding duplicative judicial effort. It
265. It is possible to transfer venue anywhere in the federal system. 28 U.S.C §§ 1391, 1404,
1407 (2006).
266. All this could change, of course-the federal courts could develop a uniform
jurisprudence in this area. But even if they did, it is unlikely that uniformity across federal
circuits would be swiftly achieved. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567, 1571-72 (2008) (describing lack of uniformity in the federal courts).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2).
268. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
269. See Griffith, supra note 4, at 54.
270. Even if these benefits are, in general, overstated, it does seem clear that federal courts,
inundated as they are by a variety of cases, would not be willing or able to develop the same
expertise in corporate cases as the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery.
271. See Myers, supra note 6 (proposing a system where all merger cases not brought in the
state of incorporation would be removed to federal court and stayed pending resolution in the
courts of the state of incorporation).
272. For a discussion of the doctrinal limitations on states' abilities to create exclusive
jurisdiction, see Winship, supra note 6, at 18-19, 21-22 (describing states' limited ability to
claim exclusive jurisdiction as to federal courts or courts of other states).
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would eliminate the additional expenses incurred by defendants when
defending in multiple forums. To the extent that Delaware courts are
predictable in their application of the discretionary substantive and
procedural legal standards, it would decrease volatility of outcomes.
Concentration of litigation in Delaware also has its costs. First,
Delaware would be unable to avoid deciding certain classes of cases
that, as mentioned earlier, it might like to avoid. Its dockets would be
clogged with "junk" cases, and it would have no alternative but to
decide those politically sensitive issues that it might prefer to
outsource. By contrast, a system that allows Delaware to outsource
both junk and politically sensitive cases will permit Delaware judges
to focus on developing the best corporate law in cases presenting novel
issues.
Second, shareholders with meritorious claims may be stymied
in Delaware because of (real or perceived) promanagement bias.
Centralization would eliminate the safety valve aspect of
multijurisdictional litigation. Indeed, the out-of-Delaware trend
encourages Delaware courts to remain receptive to plaintiffs'
interests. 273 A Delaware monopoly over merger litigation thus
threatens to increase the state's promanagement bias, leading to
worse outcomes for plaintiffs and a greater risk of federal intervention
in state corporate law.274
Finally, defendants may also suffer because centralization will
likely make it more difficult to settle low-value cases expeditiously.
Centralization means litigants cannot use the reverse auction to make
quick work of low-value claims. Less controversially, the hesitance of
Delaware courts to appoint lead counsel may make them a slower
forum in which to resolve cases than jurisdictions that can create a
clear negotiating partner with whom the defendant can settle.275
Centralization in Delaware is also unlikely to kill off low-value merger
litigation, should that be the reformers' aim, considering the
chancery's willingness to approve nonpecuniary relief and attorneys'
273. See sources cited supra note 4 (describing how competition causes Delaware to balance
its approach to shareholders and management); see also ABC, Balancing Act, supra note 6, at
1395 (arguing that the out-of-Delaware trend ought to cause chancery to be more friendly to
plaintiffs' lawyers, thereby balancing its prodefendant approach).
274. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of federal
preemption).
275. Consider the Nighthawk case in this light. Whereas the case might have continued in
Delaware chancery court, defendants were able to leverage the Arizona forum to settle the
litigation and move on with the merger. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note
127, at 4. A true Delaware-only solution would eliminate this possibility.
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fees. 276 Accordingly, even if Delaware were the sole forum for merger
litigation, plaintiffs could still file nonmeritorious suits and potentially.
hold up transactions for high-value settlements.
3. Forum Selection in the Charter or Bylaws
Moving away from top-down mandates, the solution that
attracts perhaps the most attention is the ability of Delaware
corporations to engage in self-help by adopting forum-selection bylaw
provisions in their formation documents. Delaware recently indicated
its approval of this method when Vice Chancellor Laster suggested in
dicta that "if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a
particular forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus
for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity
disputes."277 Numerous commentators picked up on this thread,
arguing that forum-selection provisions are clearly enforceable if
placed in the corporate charter 278 and arguably enforceable if placed in
the bylaws.279 Although still relatively rare, corporations have begun
to adopt forum-selection provisions.280 Interestingly, corporations
adopted these positions in the aftermath of Vice Chancellor Laster's
remarks, demonstrating how quickly the corporate bar heeds the
advice of the Delaware bench.281 As of this writing, several suits are
pending in the chancery court concerning whether forum-selection
provisions are enforceable when adopted in a corporation's bylaws
rather than its charter. 282
276. See, e.g., In re Sauer-Danfoss S'holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 2519210, at *17-
18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (discussing disclosure-only settlements and fee regimes).
277. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also, e.g., In re
Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., MDL No. 12-2389, 2013 WL 525158 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
13, 2013) (upholding Delaware forum-selection clause in firm charter as basis for dismissing
plaintiffs' actions'in California). Leading practitioners have concluded from this that "absent
fraud, a mandatory forum-selection clause . . . is absolutely enforceable under Delaware law."
DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE
DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY §5.04[a] at 5-62 (2009).
278. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 6, at 35-36.
279. LATHAM & WATKINS, DESIGNATING DELAWARE'S COURT OF CHANCERY AS THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION FOR INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTES: A NEW "MUST" FOR DELAWARE COMPANY
CHARTER OR BYLAWS 2-3 (2010).
280. Grundfest, supra note 261, at 3.
281. Id. at 7 (showing that fifty-nine percent of the firms in his sample adopted their forum-
selection provision after Revlon).
282. See Alison Frankel, Shareholder Lawyers Sue over Delaware Forum-Selection Bylaws,
THOMAS REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 8, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
Legal/News/2012/02 -_February/Shareholderlawyers sue overDelawareforum-
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Several aspects of the larger forum-selection issue bear directly
on the discussion here. 2 83 For example, the fact that corporations seem
to be adopting forum-selection provisions might undermine our
contention that the market for preclusion promises to benefit
defendants as well as plaintiffs. If defendants benefit from the market
for preclusion, why would they seek to adopt a forum-selection
provision that forces them to litigate in a single jurisdiction? We have
a twofold response to this objection.
First, not all forum-selection provisions mandate a particular
forum. Instead, the innovative elective forum-selection provision
provides the adopting corporation "with the option either to compel
that litigation proceed in the state of incorporation or to allow the
litigation to proceed in another state, but only if a complaint has been
filed in that state and only if the corporation consents."284 The election
is entirely in the hands of the defendant corporation, leaving
defendants with the tacit option of running a reverse auction or
enforcing the provision and returning to Delaware. The elective
forum-selection provision preserves the defense-side benefits of the
market for preclusion. By allocating all discretion to defendants, it
may destroy the plaintiff-side benefits, rendering it potentially
problematic. 285
selection bylaws/ (discussing cases pending in chancery court about enforcement of forum-
selection clauses). The cases include Boilermakers Local 154, Ret. Fund v. Danaher Corp., No.
7218, 2012 WL 381847 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012), and Boilermakers Local 154, Ret. Fund v.
Priceline.com, No. 7216, 2012 WL 420778 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012).
283. The technical question of whether a corporation must adopt its forum-selection
provision in the bylaws or in the charter is beyond the scope of this Article.
284. Grundfest, supra note 261, at 6. Professor Grundfest provides sample language for an
elective forum-selection provision as follows:
Unless the corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum,
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum
for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the corporation, (ii) any
action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or
other employee of the corporation to the corporation or the corporation's stockholders,
(iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or
(iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Any person
or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of
the corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the provisions of
this Article VII, Paragraph D.
Id. at 8.
285. We are concerned that such clauses would permit the most pernicious effects of the
reverse auction while severely limiting the possibility for aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers with
meritorious cases to pursue their claims. Aggressive plaintiffs would still be able to pursue their
cases in Delaware, but may not get lead counsel status there or may have to watch as the case is
sold out from under them in a reverse auction. Our view on this point is that if Delaware were to
adopt the position we advocate-that the market for preclusion ought, for now at least, to be
encouraged-then it should consider not enforcing elective forum-selection provisions since they
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Second, with respect to mandatory forum-selection provisions,
corporations may be reacting to the Delaware judiciary's rejection of
reverse auctions. Most corporations are adopting mandatory forum-
selection provisions. 286 This might imply that the market for
preclusion is of little advantage to them. This may well be; if so, it is
likely because the Delaware judiciary effectively precludes them from
using the market to their full advantage. After all, defendants' counsel
will hesitate to take advantage of the reverse auction mechanism,
even in its mildest forms, when doing so may result in the loss of their
pro hac vice status or other judicial sanction. 287 When the basic value
to them is taken away through threats and harsh criticism-criticism
that, as we have argued, is sometimes misguided-defendants can be
forgiven for finding little remaining value in participating in the
market for preclusion. This impulse-and the irregular rate of legal
change-may explain the adoption of mandatory, as opposed to
elective, forum-selection provisions. In a world where parties are free
to participate in a well-working market for preclusion, we expect few
firms to adopt mandatory forum-selection provisions.
B. Remaking the Market
Having rejected centralization, what alternative solution is
there to the distortions introduced into the market for preclusion by
the potential for opportunistic conduct? We believe that a better
balance between efficiency and federalism can be achieved by
regulating the market for preclusion through enhanced judicial
oversight. Effective judicial oversight requires that judges have the
tools and information necessary to police opportunism and the ability
to communicate and coordinate across jurisdictional lines. The next
two Sections will address first the policing function of judges and then
how communication and coordination can make judicial oversight
more effective across jurisdictional lines. We begin with what judges
can do in their own courtrooms. We also recognize that without
threaten to destroy the market by eliminating the value to plaintiffs. Even if such clauses were
upheld, our proposals of monitoring and encouraging objectors would still be necessary. There is
interesting game theoretic work to be done on the interaction between counsel selection rules,
procedural benefits, and forum selection clauses on litigation, but that is beyond the scope of this
Article.
286. Of the twenty-five forum-selection provisions in Professor Grundfest's sample, a total of
eight were elective-that is, thirty-two percent. Grundfest, supra note 261, at 10.
287. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing the threat, in Nighthawk, to
remove defense counsel's pro hoc vice status in connection with an apparent reverse auction and
the ripple effects this threat was likely to have in the defense bar).
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communication and coordination, the availability of alternative
forums will put pressure on judicial policing because strategic filers
can avoid jurisdictions where regulations do not favor them.
Accordingly, we consider what rules can be adopted to develop such
communication and coordination.
Underlying these proposals is an appeal to the basic principle
of horizontal comity: mutual respect between jurisdictions. Such
mutual respect requires an opportunity for dialogue. Given the shared
interests and culture of judges even across jurisdictions, we hope this
will ultimately lead to trust and cooperation. The development of an
ongoing dialogue between judges will ease competition between courts
and ultimately result in the type of cooperation needed to address the
problems of multidistrict litigation.288 Currently, only limited
mechanisms exist for ongoing dialogue. Our proposals fill this gap.
1. Policing Opportunism
As we have shown, the prospect of litigation agency costs
inhibits the efficient functioning of the market for preclusion. Such
opportunism on the plaintiffs' side can result in the proliferation of
low-value suits and settlements. Plaintiffs may seek to exploit
positioning rather than pressuring rules. Alternatively, plaintiffs may
abandon valid objections to inadequate settlements in exchange for a
share of attorneys' fees. On the defense side, defendants may pursue
opportunistic ends through collusive-settlement practices intended to
settle potentially high-value claims for low-value, nonpecuniary relief.
What, then, can judges do to correct the defects of the market for
preclusion while preserving its benefits?289
Judges in merger litigation should understand their policing
role as having two functions: screening claims at the initial stage of
288. For other scholarship connecting the concept of dialogue with the concerns of
federalism, see SCHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 121-51 (describing the benefits of a "polyphonic"
conception of federalism); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868
(2006) (arguing for the value of intersystemic regulation); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s),
53 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550-52 (2012) (describing plural conceptions of federalism and
their uses in different contexts); Gluck, supra note 248, at 1906-07 (arguing that federal courts
should look to state court interpretation of state statutes and vice versa in the adjudication of
cases).
289. For discussion of the judge's role in constraining litigation agency costs, see Lahav,
supra note 183, at 69 (discussing the important role of judges to guarantee fairness in class
actions); id. at 138 (discussing the fiduciary duty courts hold to class members); see also Reynolds
v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (describing the district
court judge as "a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the
law requires of fiduciaries").
1116 [Vol. 66:4:1053
THE MARKET FOR PRECLUSION
the litigation and protecting shareholders in settlement at the close of
litigation. Screening suits is important because a sophisticated
screening mechanism can help the court decide which cases are
stronger and need robust judicial protection and which involve weak
claims and can be relegated to a reverse auction mechanism. 290
Settlement oversight is necessary because of the concern that lawyers
will settle strong claims cheaply due to the combination of
jurisdictional opportunism and agency costs discussed earlier.291
Screening involves taking a hard look at the complaint and, in
many cases, applying heuristics commonly used by the Delaware
courts to separate strong claims from weak ones. Screening at the
outset of the litigation is controversial because judges may sometimes
make mistakes. We are particularly concerned about false negatives,
that is, when judges screen out strong claims.2 92 Since judges screen
cases in any event, we advocate that they do so explicitly and
communicate their evaluations to judges in other jurisdictions. Courts
should use their first look at claims to determine the level of judicial
oversight appropriate to the claims by evaluating their strengths. This
review could happen on a motion to dismiss or a number of other
motions filed at the start of the litigation.
What type of review should screening include? If, based upon a
preliminary analysis, the claims fit a pattern that suggests a strong
substantive basis for relief, judges should clearly indicate this.293
Likewise, weak claims should also be noted by judges at this stage.294
There is reason to believe that the Delaware Court of Chancery
already engages in this early-stage review of claims based upon
290. See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (discussing the uses and potential
abuses of screening mechanisms for complaints).
291. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing imperfections in the market for preclusion resulting
from sell-side and buy-side opportunism).
292. Allowing the court that is most inclined to move the case expeditiously toward litigation
to do so will err on the side of false positives. This system may allow some less meritorious cases
to go forward but is less likely to allow strong cases to be settled quickly and cheaply. In its
pleadings doctrine, the Supreme Court has adopted a "thick" screening process that does result
in the dismissal of cases that do not meet the new "plausibility" pleading standard. We do not
advocate that state courts adopt this type of standard in the preliminary stages of merger
litigation because of the policy implications of thick screening, particularly that for many classes
of cases the pleading stage is too early to tell whether a suit truly has merit. For a policy
argument against thick screening on motions to dismiss, see Bone, supra note 290, at 878-84.
293. See, e.g., Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 3-4 (discussing
indicia of a strong underlying process claim).
294. See id. at 17 ("[W]hen I see a case that is a suit against an independent majority board
after a meaningful shopping process and plaintiffs roll in saying nothing but naked price
inadequacy because it's below its 52-week high, that's a silly case.").
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generally accepted notions of what constitutes a strong versus a weak
claim.295 This early-stage review ought to be made explicit and the
result communicated to any other courts in which a suit concerning
the same merger has been filed.296 The underlying logic here is that
stronger claims deserve greater judicial attention as they move
through the system; weaker claims might rightly be consigned to the
reverse auction dynamic. By evaluating claims early and
communicating their findings, even if they are nonbinding, judges
encourage vigorous litigation where they see indicia of quality.297
There are three points early in the litigation when judges will
have the opportunity to screen claims (in addition to any substantive
motions such as a motion to dismiss). They are (1) motion for lead
counsel status, (2) motion to stay, and (3) motion for expedited
discovery. Each of these motions should be understood as an
opportunity for courts to screen the complaint and determine which
claims, if any, appear strong. These motions may come before the
courts in varying order, or may be brought simultaneously, depending
on how the case is litigated.
First, motions for lead counsel status may, or ought to, precede
motions that move the lawsuit forward because lawyers want to know
that they control the suit in order to invest resources in litigating it.
The motion for lead counsel provides a good opportunity for judges to
screen the suit and propel forward those suits that demonstrate merit.
As discussed above, Delaware courts apply the TCW factors in motions
for lead counsel, but none of these involves explicit screening of the
suit, only of counsel.298 Instead of only evaluating whether the
pleadings demonstrate the quality of counsel, courts should also
295. See id. (noting the strength of the claim); accord Donald F. Parsons & Jason S. Tyler,
Docket Dividends: Shareholder Litigation Leads to Refinements in Chancery Procedures, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 500 (2013) (noting that the motion to expedite mechanism sorts
shareholder claims into three general categories: the "wholly meritless," the "colorable," and the
"clearly meritorious").
296. See infra Part III.B.2.c. (offering further detail on how such communications might
occur).
297. But see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 444-45 (1982)
(critiquing the managerial model of judging we are alluding to here). Our response to this
critique is that merger litigation in particular may be so rife with agency costs that a more active
role for judges may be necessary.
298. The TCW (or Hirt) factors include evaluation of (1) the quality of the pleadings, (2) the
relative economic stakes of the competing litigants in the outcome of the lawsuit, (3) the
willingness and ability of counsel to litigate vigorously, (4) potential conflicts between larger and
smaller stockholders, (5) vigor of prosecution of the lawsuit thus far, and (6) counsel's
competence and access to resources. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., Nos. 19575, 19577-
78, 19584, 19592, 19608, 19613, 19632, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002) (outlining
these factors).
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evaluate whether the pleadings demonstrate the strength of the
underlying suit and communicate findings to the litigants. Courts
should take the opportunity presented by a motion for lead counsel
status to review the pleadings in alternative jurisdictions, as well, to
determine whether any lawyers have made allegations that give rise
to a more robust claim. Delaware judges sometimes do this already. 299
Our proposal differs from the existing practice of informal consultation
between courts in response to litigant requests, sometimes called a
"Savitt motion," in that it formalizes the practice and gives courts the
power to initiate such review. 300 Delaware judges would have access to
these pleadings under our proposed Merger Litigation Notification
Statute, which would require defense lawyers to file complaints
relating to the merger brought outside of Delaware with the court of
chancery. 301
Motions to stay provide a second screening opportunity. On
motions to stay, Delaware courts currently consider a number of
factors akin to forum non conveniens analysis, which is not explicitly
aimed at determining the strength of the underlying suit itself.302
Instead, courts in all jurisdictions entertaining motions to stay in a
merger suit should look at five factors. First, courts should review the
complaint in the context of those filed in other jurisdictions to
evaluate the strength of the case. Complaints with strong claims
should be given priority, as should the jurisdiction where the strongest
claims are brought.
Second, courts should consider the extent to which the case
presents novel questions of Delaware corporate law, as these cases
have the strongest claim to being decided by the Delaware Court of
Chancery. 303 This factor might be balanced against the economic
299. See id. (considering the strength of the case).
300. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 6, at 1796.
301. See infra note 327 (text of proposed Merger Litigation Notification Statute).
302. These factors include: (1) the applicability of Delaware law, (2) the relative ease of
access of proof, (3) the availability of compulsory process for witnesses, (4) the pendency or
nonpendency of a similar action or actions in another jurisdiction, (5) the possibility of a need to
view the premises, and (6) all other practical considerations that would make trial easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive. Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 136-38 (Del.
2006); see also Dias v. Purches, No. 7199-VCG, 2012 WKL 689160, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2012):
[W]hen there are multiple suits filed within a short time, this Court has tended to
employ a test similar to that used in addressing motions on forum non conveniens
grounds, and to consider whether the complaint in the competing jurisdiction is a
better or fuller pleading than the Delaware complaint.
303. This proposal shares some commonality with a recent proposal by Leo Strine,
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, and academic coauthors. Their proposal puts its
emphasis on the importance of the internal affairs doctrine and parties' choice-of-law decisions in
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interest of other forums in the outcome of the litigation, recognizing
that the merger may involve an existential question regarding an
important local company.
Third, courts should consider the extent to which the filing in
its jurisdiction is motivated by pressuring rules (such as the
availability of a jury, ease of obtaining expedited discovery as
compared to other jurisdictions, and the opportunity to schedule
preliminary injunction motions expeditiously) or by positioning rules
(such as lead counsel status having already been granted in competing
jurisdictions to other lawyers, availability of higher attorneys' fees,
and progress of the competing litigation).304 Chancery judges have not
always viewed litigation filed to take advantage of pressuring rules as
a positive factor-particularly when the pressuring rule in question is
the jury trial.305 But perhaps judges should rethink this view since a
lawyer who files in order to take advantage of a pressuring rule is
more likely to be motivated to increase value for his client.
Fourth, courts should consider the extent to which the action in
the alternative jurisdiction has been prosecuted vigorously to take
advantage of these pressuring rules.306 The theory here is that actions
that are not being actively prosecuted are more likely to lead to a low-
value settlement than actions that are being actively litigated,
because the defendant can turn to the lawyer who has adopted a wait-
and-see attitude with a low offer. Since that lawyer has not invested
much in the suit, it is easier to settle cheaply. These cases should be
stayed in favor of actively litigated cases.
A third opportunity to screen cases is the motion for expedited
discovery. In some cases, the motion for expedited discovery will be
determining where simultaneously filed litigation ought to proceed, whereas ours includes an
assessment of the strength of the suit. See Strine, Hammermesh & Jennejohn, supra note 54, at
3-9 (arguing that parties' choice of law and the internal affairs doctrine should govern forum
decisions).
304. Which type of rule motivates lawyers will be difficult to determine, and there are likely
to be many cases where mixed motives are in play. However, the court ought to take notice if
there are strong indicia that positioning rules dominate, such as when a litigant seeks lead
counsel status, but not expedited discovery, or otherwise fails actively to litigate the claim.
Delaware currently does not consider the progress of the litigation as a formal factor; New York
does. See supra Part II.B.a. But see Dias, 2012 WL 689160, at *2 (considering progress of the
litigation on motion to stay).
305. See, e.g., Rapoport v. Litig. Trust of MDIP, Inc., No. 1035-N, 2005 WL 3277911, at *4
(Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) (condemning the plaintiffs' "blatant forum shopping in search of a jury
trial").
306. See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (CD.
Cal. 2008) (noting the fact that expedited discovery was proceeding and a preliminary injunction
hearing scheduled in Delaware were among factors favoring a stay under Colorado River).
[Vol. 66:4:10531120
THE MARKET FOR PRECLUSION
the first motion that comes before the court. If the court believes a
case is important or potentially meritorious, it will be more likely to
keep that case if it grants expedited discovery. By contrast, if the court
believes the case is a "junk" case, denying a motion for expedited
discovery limits plaintiffs' ability to pressure the defendant
corporation. As a result, denial will likely lead to either a disclosure-
only settlement so that the transaction can go forward unencumbered
or settlement in a competing jurisdiction where the defendant feels
greater pressure. In the competition between jurisdictions, the
availability of expedited discovery will likely continue to play a
significant role, especially so long as the standards differ among
courts. 3 0 7 Where multiple courts have granted expedited discovery, the
case is likely a strong one. In such cases, courts most need to
coordinate adjudication to avoid duplicative litigation and promote
efficiency to the extent possible and to be especially wary of a
settlement bearing indicia that it is the product of a reverse auction.
After screening claims through motions for lead counsel status,
for a stay, for expedited discovery, or to dismiss the suit, the next
opportunity for judicial intervention is likely to be the evaluation of
proffered settlements. 308 All class action settlements must be approved
by the court to be binding and furthermore must meet the due process
requirement of adequate representation of absent class members.
These requirements give courts considerable power to police
settlement in class actions. The settlement phase is the best and final
opportunity for courts to shepherd the litigation to a fair result for
shareholders.
In ordinary litigation, judges can rely on the parties to present
both sides of a controversy. By contrast, in the settlement phase of a
class action, the defense counsel and class counsel have already
agreed to the settlement and have a shared interest that may prevent
them from presenting the court with a full picture of whatever
arguments against the settlement could be made. For this reason, the
courts cannot rely solely on the presentations by defendant and class
counsel to evaluate whether a settlement should be approved.
307. We take no position here on what standard ought to apply for discovery to be expedited,
but we note that the choice of a more rigorous standard will predictably diminish the court's
ability to hold on to certain classes of cases. It is possible that this category of cases is not one
that is important for the court to adjudicate in any event.
308. In some cases there may also be a litigated motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Fortunately, the possibility of rival counsel objecting to a settlement
can provide an antidote. 309
Objectors represent critical monitors of the class action
settlement process and serve an essential role in revealing
information to judges seeking to evaluate the fairness and adequacy of
settlement.310 Unfortunately, objectors can be induced to abandon
their objections in exchange for attorneys' fees or side payments. 311
Such side payments may be a part of obtaining "global peace." 312
Judges must therefore empower and monitor objectors if the market
for preclusion is to function optimally. 313 This can largely be done by
paying objectors a share of attorneys' fees in connection with
settlement, 314 but courts may also consider awarding successful
objectors a leadership role in subsequently pursuing the claim. 315
309. Where there are no natural objectors, the court may also decide to appoint an objector
as a kind of guardian ad litem for the class. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the
Guardians: A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 28-30
(2002) (proposing private monitors who would be paid out of settlement fund); Lahav, supra note
183, at 128 (proposing judicial appointment of a "devil's advocate" to scrutinize settlements);
Macey & Miller, supra note 95, at 4 (suggesting judicial review of settlements could be improved
by appointing guardians ad litem to represent the interests of the class).
310. See supra Part II.A.2.
311. See supra Part II.B.2.
312. As noted above, because there is a time lag between successful settlement negotiations
and judicial approval, in some cases defendants will demand that all plaintiffs in all jurisdictions
sign on to a settlement in order to provide the certainty necessary to move the transaction
forward to closing. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. In such cases, however, the lead
plaintiffs' counsel may need to provide some incentive for competing plaintiffs' counsel to sign on,
most likely by offering a share of attorneys' fees.
313. See Lahav, supra note 182, at 124 (discussing role of objectors as information
intermediaries who assist in judicial monitoring). The problem of controlling objectors may be
described as a "superagency" problem. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing
Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1630-31 (1999) (discussing second-order agency, or
"superagency," problems). The question of who will monitor the monitors is also a central concern
of corporate governance. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (1993) (analyzing
the question of who should monitor corporate managers).
314. Judges already do this, of course, but the fees they award may be suboptimal to provide
an incentive for would-be objectors to actively monitor claims. For example, in In re Allion
Healthcare Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware court that ultimately approved the settlement
of the case awarded a portion of attorneys' fees to lawyers who continued to litigate the case
aggressively in New York in parallel to the Delaware proceeding. See In re Allion Healthcare Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (splitting fees
between New York and Delaware plaintiffs). That fee award was limited, however, and perhaps
was not a sufficient incentive. See id. (refusing to split a larger portion of the fee because "New
York plaintiffs had the opportunity to sign the settlement, which they declined to do").
315. See, e.g., Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., CA. No. 1091-VCL, 2013 WL 458373 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 2012) (offering an objector the opportunity to take over prosecution of the case on
condition of posting a bond in the proposed settlement amount).
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Courts, in other words, may, in appropriate circumstances, treat
objections as implicit leadership challenges and, if successful, award
lead plaintiff status to successful objectors, thereby empowering the
successful objector to litigate or negotiate further with the defendant
and to enjoy the lion's share of any subsequent fees. This could create
an incentive for objectors to challenge those settlements where there
is a significant difference between the quality of the claim and the
value of the settlement. By effectively jumping over the settling
attorney to assume control of the claim, the former objecting attorney
would have the opportunity to extract that value, thereby pushing the
value of the settlement closer to its real value. Importantly, however,
this would not create a strong incentive for attorneys to object to low-
value settlements or appropriately valued settlements because the
margin necessary to make the attorney's intervention worthwhile
would not exist.
Determining the value of the objector's contribution to the
ultimate settlement is a difficult task. Courts must distinguish
between objectors who are merely holding up the settlement to receive
fees and those with serious and valid objections that increase the
benefit of the litigation to shareholders. Relevant factors may include
(1) the strength of the objection and any information revealed by the
objector concerning the strengths or weaknesses of the claims or of the
settlement under review, (2) objectors' behavior throughout the
litigation-that is, whether the objector has sought actively to litigate
the claim or has instead waited passively to lodge his objection, (3) the
quality of any relief offered by objectors as a potential alternative, and
(4) the likelihood that the objector would be able realistically to obtain
this relief. The attorneys' (or the firms') reputations for quality results
may also be a factor, allowing judges to consider the firms' prior
achievements in similar litigation.
The most significant risk courts face when encouraging
objectors is that the objectors will seek payment from the parties to
withdraw their objections. Recent scholarship focusing on this problem
has sought to solve it through the adoption of an inalienability rule
that would bar objectors from selling or otherwise being paid not to
pursue their objections. 316 Objectors would be forced to file and
316. Advocating such an inalienability rule for class action objectors, Professor Fitzpatrick
writes:
If objectors were prohibited from selling their right to appeal to class counsel, then
objectors who wished to appeal solely to extract rents from class counsel eager to
avoid delay, risk, and litigation costs would not bother filing appeals at all. Indeed,
even objectors who had legitimate appeals but who were happy to settle their appeals
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advocate their causes in court because only success in court would
entitle them to a share of fees. 317
Anticipating that, would-be objectors might attempt to evade
an inalienability rule by threatening to file objections and, on the basis
of those threats, cutting side deals with the settling attorneys to be
included in settlement for a share of fees.318 We would pair the
inalienability rule with a disclosure rule requiring settling plaintiffs to
disclose, prior to judicial approval of settlement, all side deals reached
with all counsel in connection with a settlement.319 Courts would have
an opportunity to inquire into the reasons underlying all side
payments and would presumably be less inclined to approve
settlements where would-be objectors had been bribed.320 In
addressing the problem of objector bribery, however, there is the risk
of going too far and chilling objectors. Courts must be careful not to
subvert the monitoring and information-forcing function of objectors.
Taken as a whole, these approaches refocus the judicial inquiry
onto the problem of litigation agency costs, both at the initial motion
stage and at the settlement stage, and empower objectors as monitors
and information agents to assist courts in settlement evaluation.
Moreover, these corrections to the current screening and settlement
process are realistically implementable. They can be acted upon at the
discretion of judges, without the need for legislative action. In order to
implement them effectively, however, judges will need to communicate
and coordinate across jurisdictional boundaries. Otherwise the
incentives created by a good set of rules in one jurisdiction will be
undone by failure to monitor in another. Unfortunately no mechanism
currently exists for such communication and coordination across
for a premium would be unable to collect those premiums. In short, inalienability
rules completely eliminate any sort of holdout tax. . . . At the same time, no legitimate
objector would be discouraged from having their appeals heard in the face of an
inalienability rule; the rule would not affect access to appellate review at all. That is,
an inalienability rule can thwart blackmail-minded objectors at the same time it
leaves access to appellate review open to sincere objectors.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 142, at 1662.
317. Id. at 1662-63.
318. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 6, at 1768-69 (characterizing multijurisdictional
litigation as being driven by a process in which plaintiffs' firms file lawsuits with the intent of
getting themselves a seat at the table with a defendant who seeks global peace).
319. Accord Brunet, supra note 142, at 446 (advocating disclosure of side deals); Lahav,
supra note 182, at 124 ("[O]bjectors who make side deals to drop objections must be required to
publicly disclose the terms of all such settlements and to have them approved by the court.");
Judith Resnik, Compared to What? ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process
and of Lawyers'Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 673 (2011) (discussing proposals).
320. See Resnik, supra note 319, at 673 (discussing requirements that side deals be disclosed
to the court).
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jurisdictions. We offer solutions to this problem in the sections that
follow.
2. Comity Communications
The trouble with judicial oversight as a solution to the
problems posed by the market for preclusion is that when alternative
jurisdictions are available, litigants may file in those courts with the
weakest oversight, thereby taking advantage of the failure of courts to
communicate and coordinate across jurisdictional lines. The best way
to handle this sort of problem might also be the simplest: for the
judges to talk to each other. Unfortunately there is currently no
official means of judicial communication across jurisdictional lines.
Because we view the dialogue between judges in sister jurisdictions as
essential to solving the problems of the market for preclusion, we offer
several suggestions for creating an infrastructure for such a dialogue,
which we call "comity communications."
Our proposed infrastructure has four aspects: (a) packaging
important precedents to reach the widest possible audience; (b)
designing a system of notice so that judges in different jurisdictions
hearing the same dispute can be made aware of that fact; (c)
instituting guidelines for informal comity communications; and (d)
creating Delaware Court of Chancery certification procedures. We
discuss each of these in turn.
a. Packaging Precedent for a Broader Audience
Much of the court of chancery's decisionmaking is unreported
in traditional case reporters. Rather, these decisions are recorded in
transcript opinions-that is, transcribed colloquies between the judge
and one or more lawyers from either or both sides. Releasing
information in this way is discretionary, as far as we can tell, and
obviates the need for chancery judges to write opinions, a time-
consuming task. Like much of the spoken word, these opinions are
relatively unstructured. They move from one topic to another in no
clear order and often include extended discussions that are not
ultimately relevant to the decision rendered. Indeed, reading
transcript opinions awakens one to the highly structured nature of the
traditional judicial opinion-the thorough recitation of facts, followed
by a discussion of relevant law, followed by the application of the law
to the facts accompanied by often elaborate justifications for applying
the law in a way that favors one side or another. Virtually all of this is
absent in a transcript opinion or, if present, typically appears in a
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disorganized, seemingly haphazard way. Not surprisingly, transcript
opinions rarely appear in case reporters or on Lexis or Westlaw.
Nevertheless, transcript opinions are often extremely
informative about how chancery judges are inclined to view current
issues in corporate practice. We have already noted several influential
transcript opinions, such as Nighthawk on the issue of reverse
auctions or Revlon on the advisability of forum-selection provisions.
For an example of a transcript opinion addressing Delaware practices
in expedited merger litigation, consider Vice Chancellor Laster's
discussion in Compellent:
Those of us who see a lot of these things know that the litigation really can't kick off
until after the preliminary proxy. That's because the principal claims that are litigated
by stockholder plaintiffs in most of these cases are disclosure claims. It's also because to
plead a meaningful process claim ... you need to see the background of the merger. You
don't get to see the background section that describes the events leading up to the
merger until the preliminary proxy. So when somebody rolls in prior to the preliminary
proxy and tries to create some flurry of activity and seek a scheduling hearing . . . what
it signals is, is that they're trying to get control of the case, not that they're acting for
the benefit of the stockholders. 32 1
This opinion signaled to litigants that the court of chancery will not
expedite merger litigation until the preliminary proxy has been
issued. Every experienced merger litigator we have spoken with
mentioned this rule as one that influences their choice of litigating in
Delaware Court of Chancery as opposed to rival jurisdictions.
The corporate bar well understands the value of transcript
opinions. Leading practitioners (or their associates) review these
transcripts as soon as they are available, bringing their partners and
leading clients immediately up to speed on what they find. Moreover,
top corporate law firms in New York and Delaware regularly release
memoranda to clients and others on their mailing lists summarizing
recent developments, often gleaned from transcript opinions. In this
way, the immediately relevant professional community-top-level
practitioners and their clients-remain well informed of Delaware law
developments regardless of the form in which they appear. Delaware's
practice of issuing transcript opinions suggests that the state relies on
this network of professional intermediation to disseminate much of its
informational output.
This network breaks down, however, when the relevant
audience for Delaware decisionmaking is outside this professional
community. In the context of the market for preclusion, the relevant
321. Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the Court's Ruling at 21-22, In re
Compellent Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011).
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audience will often be a trial court judge in another state. Not only
will this judge likely not be an expert in corporate law matters, but he
or she will also likely be a complete outsider to the way in which
corporate law norms are conveyed. How, for example, can a Minnesota
judge asked to render a decision on Delaware law be expected to
remain apprised of legal developments when the decisions are issued
in a highly disorganized form that is not compiled or reported in any of
the traditional formats but rather conveyed through a largely
exclusive network of professionals centered in Wilmington and
Manhattan?
Ordinarily the answer to this question would be that the
lawyers have an incentive to introduce this information to the sister-
state court as part of the adversarial process. But the adversarial
process, which informs judges of competing viewpoints on an issue,
does not operate effectively in the context of settlement. In presenting
a class action settlement to the court, both sides are keenly interested
in obtaining judicial approval and are not in an adversarial position
with respect to one another.322 Thus, to apply Delaware law correctly,
such a judge must not only learn what the law is, but he or she must
learn how to learn what the law is. Since no digest of transcripts
exists, a significant time investment would be required to research
these questions. It is too much to expect a busy judge and his or her
clerks to invest the time to wade through transcript opinions, even if
the judge is aware of their import. And if he or she does not bother (or
does not succeed), then this would seem to be a further factor in the
volatility of outcomes outside of Delaware.
Delaware could address this problem without having to hear all
merger cases, as the proponents of centralization advocate, by moving
away from the transcript opinion and reporting more of its judicial
output to traditional case reporters or digital databases such as Lexis
and Westlaw. Additionally or in the alternative, Delaware could invest
in a database system of its own that reliably sorted opinions by topic
and issue. Delaware could also send a regular abstract of major
decisions or established practices with respect to recurring issues to
other court systems around the country, all with the goal of making
other judges in other court systems more aware of its precedents and
322. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers'
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 807-09 (2009) (describing plaintiff-
and defense-side cooperation in the settlement of securities class actions); Lahav, supra note 182,
at 91 ("The extent to which judges police class actions is largely a matter of the individual judge's
choice, influenced by traditional views of the attorney-client relationship and settlement as a
form of private ordering.").
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general procedures. All of these innovations come at (varying) costs,
but it is in Delaware's interest to make some investment so that it can
retain the advantages of the market for preclusion while minimizing
the corruption of its law and the volatility of outcomes to Delaware-
incorporated firms. In fact, the more Delaware is able to outsource
unimportant cases, the more time the judiciary can devote to creating
a well-catalogued and easily accessible body of law.
Some of what Delaware judges discuss in transcript opinions is
not "substantive" but "procedural" according to the dichotomy we
described above and would not necessarily bind a judge in another
forum. Nevertheless, we suspect that such judges, especially those
who are new to the intricacies of corporate law, are simply looking for
guidance on how to analyze a particular issue and would be more than
happy to receive guidance from Delaware, binding or not. Moreover, in
other situations where Delaware may be concerned that the problem
is not ignorance but a prideful refusal to follow Delaware where the
judge does not have to, Delaware could incorporate more of the
heuristics it uses to determine whether a case is a "good" one into its
substantive law. For example, Delaware judges could incorporate the
requirement that a proxy issue before a case alleging disclosure is
"ripe" into the substantive law, either as a requirement for the
plaintiff to state a claim or as a condition precedent to success on the
merits. We do not take a position on whether this would be a
beneficial change in the law. Our point instead is that the heuristics
Delaware judges use are not easily accessible under the current
regime. The more these heuristics are incorporated into the
substantive cause of action, rather than as rules of thumb with respect
to when certain procedures are available, the more likely it is that
sister-state courts will take heed. 323
In sum, the market for preclusion and the proliferation of
merger litigation have created a new audience for Delaware corporate
law jurisprudence: members of the judiciary of other state and federal
courts. In order to reach this audience, Delaware should rethink the
form of its judicial decisionmaking, recording its precedent in a more
323. An objection may be raised here that the value of Delaware law is not its set of
substantive rules but rather its system of fact-specific judicial discretion. Thus our emphasis on
prescriptive heuristics might threaten to make Delaware law rigid and thereby diminish its core
value. We are not advocating a wholesale retreat from judicial discretion to a strictly rule-based
approach. Our suggestion is merely that Delaware clarify the tools its judges use in exercising
their discretion in order to prevent judges in other states from mishandling it. For a discussion of
how law oscillates between hard and soft sets of rules, see generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
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traditional and easily accessible form. Delaware should make clear the
heuristics it uses to evaluate the merits of cases by incorporating
these explicitly into its merits evaluation to create greater
predictability. Delaware's current practices recall a now-bygone era
when a highly expert group of corporate lawyers could be counted on
to convey the latest developments to all of those in the loop. Now that
critical consumers of Delaware law-state and federal judges in
various faraway places-are not likely ever to be in this loop,
Delaware needs to adapt.
b. Providing Notice of Multijurisdictional Litigation
Before two parties can discuss an issue, they must know that
they have an issue to discuss. The absence of this knowledge often
frustrates the ability of judges across jurisdictions to communicate
meaningfully about merger litigation. Frequently, a judge will not
know whether or where parallel litigation has been filed until a
motion for a stay is filed or until settlement has been reached. 324 Often
judges rely on the parties, especially defendants seeking stays, to
inform them of competing lawsuits. If the judge does not know where
else plaintiffs have filed, he or she has no opportunity to discuss the
litigation process with the judge(s) in the other jurisdiction(s). There is
no established mechanism for informing Delaware or other state
courts of pending merger litigation in other jurisdictions nor is there
presently any sort of central registry where related litigation in
different states can be tracked.2 8
As a preliminary step, we suggest the adoption of a statute
requiring defendants in merger litigation to inform judges everywhere
such litigation has been filed that substantially similar litigation has
also been filed in another jurisdiction and to provide the judges in
each jurisdiction with a copy of the related complaint filed
elsewhere. 326 Such notice would make it possible for the judges to
324. Although no permission is needed to file a lawsuit, after a class action has been
certified, the judge's approval is required before the case can be settled or voluntarily dismissed.
See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 23(e) ('The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval."). Delaware's version of
Rule 23 parallels the federal rule. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.
325. By contrast, in the federal courts litigants are required to note if their litigation is
related to other pending litigation at the time of filing. This designation is used to assign cases.
326. A similar provision is found in CAFA, requiring notice to states' attorneys general of
class action settlements. See 28 U.S.C § 1715 (2006) (requiring notification of states' attorneys
general). See generally Catherine Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal
Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008) (discussing CAFA).
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discuss the litigation with one another and to coordinate future
proceedings. Because the party with access to this information is the
defendant-who can be counted upon to know all of the jurisdictions
where it has been sued-the statute would require the defendant to
serve notice of parallel litigation, attaching copies of complaints, in
every jurisdiction where related litigation is pending.327
We understand that chancery judges will not eagerly await
these notifications and pore over the attached complaints. They could,
however, assign them to their clerks for review and, when a particular
complaint raises concerns that seem especially relevant to Delaware-
a claim raising a novel issue of law, for example, or a claim providing
an opportunity to clarify or extend an existing legal doctrine-the
Delaware judge could contact the judge in the other jurisdiction to
discuss the question of where the issue should be decided. These
discussions may not always be successful, but we suspect that they
will be more often than not.328 In any event, the discussion is not
possible at all without some form of notice.
Notice is a first step to promoting comity. Because notice comes
early in the litigation, dialogue is more likely since no judge has
invested time and effort in the case. When a court is faced with a
situation such as that in Nighthawk-a settlement that appears to be
an end run around chancery-it is almost too late to have a dialogue
about where a case should be litigated, the most efficient form of
litigation, and how cooperation can be managed if the case proceeds in
tandem in more than one jurisdiction. If judges are to communicate
fruitfully with one another, that communication should begin upon
filing, not when the case has already developed and judges have sunk
time and effort into deciding motions and have developed a sense of
ownership over the case. The next question is how, after notice has
327. Suggested statutory language for a Merger Litigation Notification Statute is as follows:
No later than 5 days after the filing of a lawsuit or amended complaint against an
entity incorporated under the laws of this state relating to a merger, acquisition or
other business combination, each defendant shall file with the Register of the
Delaware Court of Chancery the following documents: a copy of the complaint or
amended complaint and any materials filed with such complaints or amended
complaints. If such documents are made electronically available through the Internet,
a filing under this provision may consist of notice of how to electronically access such
material.
No later than 5 days in advance of any hearing regarding a settlement of any action
defined under paragraph (A) of this statute, the defendants shall file with the Register
of the Delaware Court of Chancery a copy of the order granting the hearing, a copy of
the proposed settlement, and copies of any objections to the settlement that were filed
with the court in that action.
328. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing Topps and expressing the
view that the case represents an important exception to the general rule).
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been served, communication between sister jurisdictions can best be
encouraged and streamlined.
c. Creating a Means of Informal Comity Communications
Once informed of parallel litigation, the judges in the various
jurisdictions will have an opportunity to communicate about the
course of the litigation. Delaware judges, as we have suggested, may
use this opportunity to persuade the judges in the other jurisdictions
to allow the case to move forward in Delaware, a request that, we
suspect, the overburdened judges in the other jurisdictions will often
be happy to grant.329 In situations where the court does not cede to
Delaware or Delaware does not want the case, communication can
lead to greater predictability and uniformity by allowing sister courts
to utilize chancery's expertise. Finally, communication will allow
courts to strengthen their relationships with one another and enhance
mutual respect, in contrast to jurisdiction stripping, which would do
neither of these. In this Section we consider what form these
communications should take and what limitations should be placed on
them.
Communication between judges across jurisdictions is not
unheard of. For example, some chancery judges are already
communicating with judges who have parallel litigation before them
either through informal telephone conversations (which we assume
take place ex parte) or by providing documentation. In Nighthawk,
Vice Chancellor Laster ordered that the transcript of the hearing at
which he excoriated the defense lawyers for engaging in a reverse
auction be sent to the judge in Arizona overseeing the settlement.330
We question whether communication by transcript is the clearest
means of expressing the Vice Chancellor's concerns, but this
nevertheless represents a form of comity communication. For another
example, consider the following statement by former Chancellor
Chandler in Allion:
329. We recognize that sometimes judges will take a territorial approach to these cases or be
interested in retaining them because they involve large transactions or prominent litigants.
Increased communication and trust may go some way to resolving these disagreements. For a
discussion of developing this type of rapport and the habits of thought that encourage it in the
political sphere, see AMY GUTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY
GOVERNING DEMANDS IT AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES IT (2012). Other judges might retain a
merger suit because it involves existential questions about a company based in the forum. In our
view, this may be a legitimate reason for a state court to retain a case. See supra notes 246-47
and accompanying text.
330. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 127, at 25.
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My personal preferred approach, for what it's worth, is for defense counsel to file
motions in both (or however many) jurisdictions where plaintiffs have filed suit,
explicitly asking the judges in each jurisdiction to confer with one another and agree
upon where the case should go forward. In other words-and I mentioned this during an
earlier oral argument in this case-my preference would be for defendants to 'go into all
the Courts in which the matters are pending and file a common motion that would be in
front of all of the judges that are implicated, asking those judges to please confer and
agree upon, in the interest of comity and judicial efficiency, if nothing else, what
jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions are going to stand
down and allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter.' Of course, as I recognized at the
time, judges in different jurisdictions might not always find common ground on how to
move the litigation forward. Nevertheless, this would be, I think, one (if not the most)
efficient and pragmatic method to deal with this increasing problem. It is a method that
has worked for me in every instance when it was tried.331
Our approach is similar to Chancellor Chandler's suggestion,
except that rather than waiting for defense counsel to expressly ask
the various judges across jurisdictions to confer, the judges would be
empowered to enter into these conversations of their own volition. We
are proposing an infrastructure where.judges can freely communicate
regarding multijurisdictional litigation.
Ex parte judicial communications are not without controversy.
The traditional judicial role involves the neutral judge making all
decisions after hearing argument from counsel, giving each litigant a
chance to participate prior to the decision in their case being rendered.
By contrast, ex parte communications between judges would result in
a determination of whether, where, and how the litigation will
proceed-decisions that determine the outcome of the litigation-
without the litigants being present.
The main objection to ex parte conferences is that they limit
litigant autonomy. Such conferences could lead to substantive
decisions or undue influence over substantive decisions without
counsel having the opportunity to participate in the discussion. This
would impose a limitation on each litigant's day in court and his
ability to participate fully in the litigation. These are serious concerns.
Judges ought to give litigants an opportunity to present their
arguments regarding any major decision in the litigation, including
choice of forum, dismissal, coordinated expedited discovery, or the
refusal to expedite. But there is strong precedent for judicial conferral.
The Justices of the Supreme Court confer with one another in
conference prior to assigning opinions and as the opinions are drafted
and revised. Appellate courts sit on three-judge panels and, in some
controversial cases, review decisions en banc. Even trial-level judges
331. In re Allion Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 n.12 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (citations omitted).
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confer with their clerks outside the presence of counsel, perhaps also
with each other. There is no reason why conversations that happen in
chambers cannot also happen intrachambers. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that in other contexts, such as in parallel litigation
concerning mass torts, judges conduct ex parte conferences with sister
courts in order to streamline motions and avoid duplicative
litigation.332 We see no reason why judges should be barred from
conferring with one another so long as the parties have had the
opportunity to weigh in on the issues to be decided either orally or in
writing.
It is true that the traditional judicial role, at least at the trial
level, is based on the idea that a single judge decides a case. There is
no room in this traditional conception of the judicial role for judicial
dialogue except over time through opinions. This is because the judge
is presumed to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the
particular lawsuit. In parallel litigation, as at the appellate and
Supreme Court levels, multiple judges are in a position to make
decisions about a case, and the theory of judging needs to evolve to
take account of this. Accordingly, interstate judicial discussions should
be permitted outside the presence of the litigants, although litigants
should receive notice of the subject of such discussions and these
conferrals should be preceded by opportunities for the parties to
present their arguments.
A second objection is that even if such conferences are
conducted with the opportunity for counsel to be heard prior to
conferral, comity communications overstep the judicial role, which
traditionally does not permit judges to consider issues sua sponte, but
instead relies on the litigants to raise issues on their own. By
necessity such a conferral would be judge, rather than litigant, driven
some of the time.
The requirement that judges raise issues on their own in some
situations is a corollary to the requirement that judges develop the
law through judicial decisions. 333 It is also a corollary to the doctrines
of judicial avoidance and the set of doctrines the Supreme Court has
adopted to "avoid avoidance." 334 Henry Monaghan demonstrates that,
332. See supra note 236 (discussing informal communications in circumstances of parallel
cases).
333. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L. J. 447, 453-54 (2009) (defending
judges raising issues sua sponte when the parties have failed to adequately address all issues of
a litigation).
334. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control and Related Matters,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 684-85 (2012).
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at least where the Supreme Court is concerned, the dominant model of
judicial decisionmaking is the law-declaration model and that the
Court has adjusted its various mechanisms of avoidance to serve this
goal.335 There is an emerging recognition that the pure dispute-
resolution model of judging, where the judge plays a passive role and
adjudicates the dispute as it is presented to him or her, is not
desirable and does not reflect the reality of litigation.336 A similar
recognition is necessary in multijurisdictional litigation. In the
absence of litigant coordination, judges are a natural place to look to
regulate the litigation market prior to the moment when a class
settlement precludes all others by operation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
Finally, in the class action context, judicially driven regulation
of the market for preclusion is supported by the structure of the class
action rule.3 37 That rule requires judges to review settlements or
voluntary dismissals and approve or disapprove of them. It permits
judges to appoint counsel, fire counsel, and determine counsel's
compensation. All of these powers are reserved to the client in the
ordinary case. Accordingly, structurally embedded into the class action
rule is the mandate that judges act independently of the litigants in
monitoring the litigation. The proposal here is merely an extension of
that power.
How would the process of comity communications work? We
propose a set of best practices analogous to that provided by the
Manual on Complex Litigation, widely referred to by judges and
practitioners to solve recurring problems in multidistrict litigation and
class actions. 338 Upon notice of a competing litigation concerning the
same merger, whether through the notification system described
above or in the process of certifying a class and settlement, the judge
in each jurisdiction would contact the judges overseeing the parallel
cases. The judges would hold an initial conference call to discuss the
status of the litigation in each jurisdiction. Then the judges would
notify the parties of their intent to confer regarding specific issues
335. Id. at 683-85.
336. The classic articulation of this argument was in the public law sphere. See Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (arguing
that the involvement of the judge in public law litigation is workable and inevitable to ensure
justice in a regulatory society). For a broader historical view on the controversy, see generally
Amalia Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process and the Search for
an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005).
337. The Delaware class action rule tracks FED. R. CIV. P. 23, as do the class action rules in
many states. Compare DEL. CH. CT. R. 23, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
338. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 236.
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such as the propriety of staying one action in favor of the other,
appointment of lead counsel, expedited discovery, and discovery
coordination. At that time, the parties would have the opportunity to
brief the judges on their positions with respect to the issues up for
discussion. Oral argument by conference call or video conferencing
would also be possible upon motion. Thereafter, the judges would
confer with one another and issue their separate rulings.
We anticipate that in most cases this process will result in the
stay of all the suits but those proceeding in one jurisdiction. But this
process would not mandate deferral to a single jurisdiction and leaves
open the possibility that in the rare case the rival jurisdictions may
not defer to a single forum. In such a case, there is still a benefit to
judicial coordination of the various aspects of the litigation, such as
scheduling discovery and preliminary injunction motions, to avoid
repetitive litigation. The process would be respectful of the equal
validity of rival jurisdictions and the structural reality of concurrent
jurisdiction, which is a central (if sometimes frustrating) feature of our
federalism.
Over time, as practices emerge and judges become more
accustomed to these conferrals, we hope that a cooperative spirit will
develop between judges of different jurisdictions. We also hope that
this continuing dialogue will educate judges in different jurisdictions
concerning the different procedural regimes in sister courts and
thereby promote the adoption of the best among these procedures.
This may lead to the organic development of a robust form of comity in
which state and federal courts engage in a joint enterprise of law
creation.
d. Chancery Certification and Other Formal Communications
In addition to the infrastructure for informal communications
described above, we believe that there should be a means by which
sister states can formally certify questions to the chancery court.339
Currently, Delaware law contemplates certification to the Delaware
339. Suggested language for a court of chancery certification statute is as follows:
The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions of law
certified to it by United States District Courts and the trial courts of any other state,
where it appears to the Court of Chancery that there are important and urgent
reasons for an immediate determination of such questions by it. The Court of
Chancery may, by rules, define the conditions under which questions may be certified
to it and prescribe methods of certification.
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Supreme Court, 340 a process that, although vanishingly rare, is not
without precedent. 341 Nevertheless, certification to the supreme court
is not an appropriate means of addressing the types of issues that are
likely to arise in multijurisdictional merger litigation. The principal
reason for this is speed of resolution. Merger litigation, as we
described above, must be decided quickly-most cases are resolved
forty-five to sixty days from filing.342 The Delaware Supreme Court,
like most appellate courts, cannot be expected to routinely move at
that speed, even though it has been relatively expeditious in deciding
cases certified to it by federal courts and agencies. 343
The court of chancery is well placed to hear such certifications.
A large part of its caseload consists of merger cases, which it
customarily decides in the necessary one- to two-month window.
Moreover, certified cases that come to the court of chancery in the
context of multijurisdictional merger litigation are unlikely to present
a significant additional burden to the court since the same case is
likely also proceeding in the court of chancery itself.344 A system could
be created that allowed the certified question to be referred to the
same judge hearing the Delaware case, guaranteeing that the vice
chancellors would not have to spend a great deal of time educating
themselves as to the relevant factual context. The only risk of such a
procedure is that the chancellor in question may have already formed
an opinion as to the merits of the litigation.
Similarly, the types of questions likely to be certified at this
stage in the litigation are those with which the court of chancery
would be most familiar and for which the court has developed
340. DEL. CONST., art. IV, § 11(8) (providing authority for the Delaware Supreme Court to
hear and decide questions certified by Delaware courts, U.S. federal courts, the SEC, or the
highest appellate court of any state); see also Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of
Guesswork: The Delaware Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU
L. REV. 1127 (2010) (discussing how to avoid the "thickets" by certifying questions of law process
on corporate law to the Delaware Supreme Court).
341. Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010) (answering question certified by Judge
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York).
342. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 9 (finding that the median time between
the lawsuit and the settlement is forty-four days).
343. We note that the Delaware Supreme Court can be expeditious in deciding these issues.
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York certified a question to the Delaware Supreme
Court on July 7, 2010 and received an answer on August 27, 2010. Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d
277, 280 (Del. 2010); see also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008)
(deciding on July 9, 2008 and modifying on August 15, 2008 an SEC certification of a question of
Delaware law that was submitted on June 27, 2008).
344. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 6, fig.3 (finding that forty-six percent
and forty-three percent of acquisition-related lawsuits against companies incorporated in
Delaware were filed in Delaware and other forums for 2010 and 2011, respectively).
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heuristics, such as the limitation on expediting discovery in cases
where a preliminary proxy has not been issued. For example, courts
might certify questions of the propriety of particular processes for
entering into a merger or other aspects of the validity of particular
claims that would assist the courts in determining the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success on the merits. In other words, this would be a
formal means for sister-state courts to determine "what would
Delaware do?" in a given situation.
If certification becomes a routine practice, this may spur
Delaware's confidence that sister states are not deciding cases in
unpredictable ways. When the case is meritorious and shareholders
ought to receive compensation, Delaware can play a bigger part in
ensuring this happens. Certification can also serve as an antidote to
territoriality, both literally and figuratively. Certification is an
antidote to territoriality literally construed because it allows the rival
jurisdiction to retain power over a case while leveraging the expertise
of the Delaware courts. In this way Delaware law more effectively
crosses state lines. It is an antidote to figurative territoriality because
it encourages power sharing between courts, rather than
understanding jurisdiction as total power over a case or its dismissal.
There is a burgeoning literature on certification of questions
between state courts as well as states and other entities, including
legislatures and administrative agencies. 345 In the past, certification
has been largely understood to be a rare occurrence that invoked the
powers of the highest court in the jurisdiction.3 4 6 With the increased
importance of lower courts in making final determinations, especially
in the fast-moving area of merger class actions where settlement is the
order of the day, certification to the court of chancery is a sensible
option.
From the perspective of the sister state's court, certification to
chancery would allow judges unfamiliar with corporate law
complexities to seek guidance from an expert judiciary. In this way,
chancery court certification would reduce the volatility of outcomes
from multiforum merger litigation in a way that is acceptable to
345. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007)
(arguing that federal courts should have the option to certify certain statutory questions to
Congress); Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State Law
Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 179, 182-84 (2010) (proposing that federal
agencies should be able to certify state-law related questions to state courts).
346. A full analysis of chancery certification and potential pitfalls is beyond the scope of this
Article, but we think it a promising avenue for investigation. For a discussion of certification in
this context, see Winship, supra note 6.
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defendants and the state of Delaware alike, both of which are
interested in greater uniformity and consistency in the application of
Delaware law. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, lose some of their ability to
pressure defendants into settlement due to uncertainty, but because
the system leaves the authority of the sister jurisdiction largely
intact-certification, after all, is at the discretion of the trial court-
plaintiffs retain the ability to file in jurisdictions with advantageous
procedural rules.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the market for preclusion is a more
promising approach than the centralization of merger litigation in a
single forum. A well-working market for preclusion allows weak cases
to settle quickly and cheaply while ensuring that strong cases settle
for more significant consideration. An active market for preclusion has
the additional benefit of limiting the strain on Delaware's courts from
an influx of weak cases or the occasional politically charged case.
Although the current market is imperfect, we believe it can be
corrected through some of the policy measures we have outlined. A
regulated multiforum regime would allow courts to fast-track "good"
cases and leave "bad" cases on a slower course likely to end in cheap
settlement and lead to outcomes superior to a regime of centralization.
The market for preclusion also respects the real interests of the
states in deciding existential questions for locally headquartered
corporations, even if those corporations are incorporated elsewhere. In
that sense, the market for preclusion fits well with our federalist
structure of government. Moreover, the encouragement of mutual
respect and dialogue among state judiciaries that we have advocated
as a solution to defects in the market for preclusion may pay dividends
in the development of the law more generally. Accordingly, we think
the market for preclusion can strike a workable balance between
federalism and efficiency.
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The Supreme Court has held that pretrial detainees are
presumed innocent and that their detention does not constitute
punishment. If convicted, however, detainees usually receive credit
at sentencing for the time they spent in detention. We reduce their
punishment by time spent unpunished.
Crediting time served conflicts with the commonly held view
that punishment should be proportional to blame. Offenders who
deserve to be punished by a year in prison but spend a year in
pretrial detention may be released immediately at sentencing and
technically receive no punishment at all.
One way to solve the mystery of credit for time served is to
recognize that people don't care about proportional 'punishment" in
the narrow way the Supreme Court and many theorists use the term.
Rather, they seek to dispense proportional "harsh treatment." Even
though pretrial detention is technically not punishment, it is harsh
treatment inflicted by the state, and most believe offenders deserve
credit for it.
Shifting focus to proportional harsh treatment, however,
solves one problem at the expense of several others. For if state-
inflicted harsh treatment before conviction counts for purposes of
assessing proportionality, then surely state-inflicted harsh treatment
afterward should count too. While we could try to salvage
proportionality by better measuring harsh treatment, I explain the
sometimes absurd consequences of doing so.
Even though retributivist notions of proportionality are
central to sentencing systems around the world and are widely
thought to undergird core notions of criminal justice, both
proportional punishment and proportional harsh treatment have
profoundly counterintuitive implications. When the weaknesses in
retributivist proportionality are revealed, consequentialist
punishment theories look correspondingly more appealing.

